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FOREWORD
In addition to the existing micrometeoroids, dead satellites, remains of rocket stages and a multitude of
other pieces of man-made space debris speeding at a hypervelocity around the Earth could damage
severely the planned International Space Station Alpha (ISSA).
This report presents the results of an additional work-study that supplement the ongoing engineering
activities by The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), BOEING Aerospace
Company and Contractors for the optimization of the survivability of ISSA when under micro-
meteoroids or orbital debris (M/OD) threats. Successfully mitigating the technical, schedule, and cost
uncertainty associated with the development and integration for creating the catastrophic failure risk
models, the failures' modes and procedures for estimating their likelihood and provides specific
estimates for the ISSA design are a progressing multi-disciplinary technical and management
challenge.
NASAJMSFC contracted Meyer Analytics, Incorporated (MA) through Science Applications
International Corporation (SAIC) for supporting NASA for the development and verification of risks
models for predicting the likelihood of catastrophic failure of selected components of the ISSA due to
impact by M/OD. Catastrophic failure in this context means the occurrence of an event, like rapid
depressurization and/or unzipping of an habitable module, resulting in the loss of a crew or the loss of
the entire ISSA.
The performed work-study by MA for supporting NASA in the above activities, centralized into two
major technical areas. The first one concerns the Critical Crack Length (CCL) of four ISSA manned
Modules, which is described in Section A of the report. The second one, given in Section B, address
the primary, and secondary, effects of M/OD penetration on the proposed Russian Functional Energy
Block (FGB), or called sometimes the Space "TUG", propulsion module and propellant tanks arrayed
in pairs around its exterior, and on the Gyrodynes module.
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NOTATION
A
AFM
a
ao
ac
B
Bu.c
CCL
CG
CL
CMOD
CT
CTIP
CTOA
CTOD
CCT
c
D
d
e
E
EFM
EPFM
ESIF
F
Fry
Ftu
FEA
FEM
G
H
h
i
area
advanced fracture mechanics
half-crack length
initial half-crack length
critical half-crack length
compact tension (CT) fracture test specimen thickness
uncertainties on fracture parameters
critical crack length
center of gravity
center-line
crack-mouth opening displacement
implying compact tension
crack-tip
crack-tip opening angle
crack-tip opening displacement
center cracked tension (fracture type of test specimen)
subscript denoting critical value
shell diameter
hole diameter
subscript for energy
material modulus of elasticity (Young's Modulus)
elastic fracture mechanics
elastic-plastic fracture mechanics
elastic stress intensity factor (also, SIF)
force vector
material tensile yield strength
material ultimate tensile strength
finite element analysis
finite element method; finite element modeling
material shear modulus (also denoted by p.); Griffith strain energy release rate.
height (i.e., for a compact tension specimen)
thickness (_Jsedin lieu of t, for time)
subscript
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NOTATION, Continued
J
J
KI
KII
KIc
Kilns
Kp
L
LSY
n
NCM
O
PE
r,0
ro
rp
R
Rm
S
SE
SED
SERR
SHE
SIF
SSY
t
T
UxjUy,Uz
V
VCC
W
x,y,z
X,Y,Z
subscript
path-independent contour integral ( J - Rice integral)
mode one (I) fracture toughness or stress intensity factor
mode two (11)fracture toughness or stress intensity factor
critical fracture toughness at crack-initiation, quasi-static (stable crack growth)
critical fracture toughness at crack instability, quasi-static (unstable crack grow)
plastic stress intensity factor
length (i.e., tip-to-tip crack length)
subscript implying large scale yielding
material strain hardening exponent (Ramberg-Osgood Law)
nonlinear computational mechanics
subscript implying initial conditions (i.e., initial crack-length)
potential energy
polar coordinates
radius
crack-tip plastic zone in plane stress
radius; reliability (Weibull); R-curve
membrane shell radius
arc length
strain energy
strain energy density
strain energy release rate
strain hardening exponent
stress intensity factor
subscript implying small scale yielding
time
traction
displacement components in the x, y, and z coordinate directions respectively
volume
virtual crack closure
width of a compact tension (CT) fracture test specimen; external work; SED
Cartesian Coordinates
Cartesian Coordinates
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NOTATION, Continued
C_
F
8
S
V
0
_t
q
P
crack angle
bulging factor
closed contour about a crack-tip
displacement
strain
stress
elastic Poisson's ratio
energy release rate (see also G)
hoop coordinate; angle
shell geometry parameter; crack length parameter
shear modulus (G also used in solid mechanics)
dimensionless constant (elastic-plastic fracture mechanics)
mass density
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AI - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The effects of micrometeoroids and orbital debris (M/OD) on the station equipment can result from a
local damage problem to a possible catastrophic system failure, followed by either crew loss or station
loss. Diverse failure mechanisms were identified, which are the result of M/OD hits. Three of these
are directly applicable to the habitable modules: 1) crew injury from debris or decompression; 2)
uncontrollable station attitude due to venting pulse; 3) station principal structure overloading due to
venting forces. All these mechanisms have a common denominator: the station pressurized elements
wall penetration by M/OD cloud particles. The prevalent factor affecting each failure mechanisms is
the probability of a penetration inducing, in addition to a perforation, unstable crack lengths which
could "unzip" a pressurized element. The term "unzip" is the uncontrolled propagation of a crack from
the point of penetration to otherwise undamaged structure.
Section A of this report summarizes the conducted analytical study and the obtained results for
determining the critical crack length (CCL) of the ISSA Manned Modules which includes the United
States of America (US) HAB or LAB Module, the Russian FGB (TUG) Module, the European Space
Agency (ESA) MPLM COLUMBUS Module, and the Japan's National Space Development Agency
(NASDA) JEM PM LAB Module, as depicted in Figure 1, while pressurized. Additionally, selected
highly pressurized auxiliary tanks of the Russian FGB Propulsion Unit are also addressed.
Classical engineering structural mechanics, and advanced fracture mechanics concepts coupled with
numerical solution techniques were used to predict the strength of these pressure vessels in which
cracks had completely penetrated 'the vessel wall, as shown pictorially in Figure 2. The principal
component investigated of these habitable modules was the orthotropic shell comprising the main
body. For two modules, were complete structural design details could be made available, their end-
cones CCL were also evaluated. These are only for the US and the ESA modules.
A summary on the respective ISSA Modules critical crack length (CCL) is displayed in Table I. The
CCL shown are for the CCL at initiation and stable growth, and at unstable growth or the CCL level
for which 'unzipping' of a particular structure could occur.
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Figure 1 - INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION ALPHA (ISSA)
Meteoroid & Orbital Debris Critical Elements
(Courtesy of NASA & Lockheed, Houston, TX)
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Orthotropic Wall
(stiffened skin construction)
Waffle - 45°
Waffle - 90°
Crack Bulging Effects
due to Internal Pressure
/
/ /
'fb-'---Z
Cylindrical Shell Section
Axial Crack
Crack-Tip (CTIP)
Reinforcement Rings
End Cone
Axial Crack
Crack Length (CL)
and
Critical Crack Length (CCL)
Possible "Unzipping"
(Catastrophic Failure)
Figure 2 - THROUGH THE WALL LONGITUDINAL (axial) CRACKS
in a TYPICAL ISSA PRESSURIZED MANNED MODULE
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TABLE I - SUMMARY ON THE ISSA MANNED MODULES CRITICAL CRACK LENGTH
CRACK LENGTH (in(;:h)
Notes: 1 = Stable Initiation and Growth
2 = Unstable (Critical)
N/A = not applicable
* For the Russian FGB Propulsion Module, it will be very difficult to propagate a
crack within the waffle-skin under 14.9 psia pressure loading alone.
Other damage conditions must prevail in order to "unzip" the shell.
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All - INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this report is to describe the analytical and modeling efforts performed for assessing
the risk level of the ISSA pressurized modules structure under Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris
(M/OD) cloud threat. These modules will team-up with the cluster of other modules used in the
International Space Station Alpha (ISSA), as shown in Figure 1.
The risk level here is defined as the criticality for these modules to "unzip" catastrophically if they are
subjected to orbital debris cloud impact and subsequent pressure wall penetration.
There is no simple solution to the catastrophic rupture problem of an orthotropic cylindrical shell
structure. Tension load carried in the shell pressure wall can cause an existing crack (or crack
emanating from a perforation) to grow in an abrupt and unbounded fashion (unzipping), if the initial
crack length exceeds a certain length called the Critical Crack Length (CCL). The probability of
unzipping has been demonstrated by previous research work performed by several organizations,
including by NASA laboratory experiments with pressure vessels impacted by hypervelocity
projectiles. A catastrophic rupture of a pressurized element, in particular high pressurized elements
as the propulsion tanks will be, by itself, a debris-inducing event, posing the greatest threat to crew
survival and the station. This catastrophic scenario imposed the need to determine, among other
variables, the CCL of ISSA pressurized vessels.
However, to minimize risks of penetration, the pressurized ISSA elements possess a structural
arrangement as a defense against M/OD threat, called a double-walled M/OD bumper system, or
"Whipple Shield". If the standoff shield is penetrated by a projectile, the debris from the projectile and
the shield will travel across the distance between bumper and the shell pressure wall, and strike the
pressure wall. The induced damage on the vessel wall by the debris cloud loading may result in a
penetration, petaling, and cracks.
To assess the damage tolerance of these habitable modules (and other pressurized elements) to
M/OD strikes, we have used the technology of fracture mechanics principles in addition to classical
numerical methods, like the Finite Element Method.
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AIII - FRACTURE MECHANICS
AIII-1 PROLOGUE
Essentially, the fracture strength of pressure vessels with through the wall cracks (Figure 2), is related
to the vessel radius and thickness, the crack geometry (crack tip and crack length), the material
elastic modulus, yield, and ultimate tensile strengths, the material fracture toughness, and the loading
conditions (i.e., pressure, temperature, time effects). The problem has been to define a suitable
expression that takes into account all known variables affecting the crack driving force, or Stress
Intensity Factor (SIF), at the crack tip.
The use of classical Linear Elastic Fracture Mechanics (LEFM = quasi-static assumptions, i.e., brittle)
versus Advanced Fracture Mechanics (AFM = nonlinear and dynamic effects, i.e., ductile) for
estimating the SlF, introduces another type of constraint. The former, being much more simpler, is
usually the preferred method; and it gives usually conservative estimates for the SIF. However, the
AFM techniques, which are inherently more sophisticated, permits a better and more realistic
evaluation of the SIF. Both methods were used in this study. A brief overview on the methodology of
how to estimate the SIF in cracked structures is given in this section. Only the problem of thin
pressure vessels and fiat panels with through cracks in a state of plane stress is addressed.
Once the SIF is assessed, the rupture strength of the vessel is estimated by comparing the SIF
against the material resistance to fracturing, i.e., the fracture toughness, K¢.
AIII-2 STRESS INTENSITY FACTOR (SIF) DETERMINATION AT A CRACK TIP
Nowadays, several techniques exists to undertake stress intensity factor (SIF) evaluation at a crack
tip. The following methods, among others, are used extensively:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
closed form solution for simple structural systems;
displacement extrapolation;
strain-energy release rate approach;
virtual crack extension technique;
virtual crack closure method, via FEM;
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f)
g)
strip yield model (Crack Opening Displacement, COD);
path independent J - integral (RICE-integral).
In our study, we have adopted at first, the available closed form solutions for a quick SIF assessment.
Then, we have utilized a combination of c, e, f, and g techniques.
a) Closed Form Solutions:
For isotropic cylindrical shells with through the thickness longitudinal cracks, closed form solution for
the SIF calculation were developed by Folias [I] and Newman [2] some time ago and are here
exhibited by Equation 1.0 and Equation 2.0, respectively. However, they are somewhat limited to low
shell geometric ratio R/h (membrane radius to wall thickness ratio), and small crack lengths. They
were used in this work-study for comparative purpose only.
FOLIAS (Through-Wall Axial Crack, Monocoque Shells, valid range:5 < RJh < 50)
p.R / I (.o)2 ]
SIF(Mode I) h Eq.l.0
p = internal pressure
ao = half-crack length
gm = shell membrane radius
h = shellwall thickness
NEWMAN (Axial Through Wall Crack, Monocoque Shells)
p-Rm
SlF(Mode I) = ---fi---_-ao.F N Eq. 2.0
FN = shell-curvature correction factor for an axial through-wail crack
= [I.0+ [0.52"Xh+ 1.29"(Xh) 2- 0.074"(Xh)3;] °5°
Xh = ao.(,_-h)- '
A-7
MA-TR-101-95
SECTION A
INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION ALPHA
c) Strain-Energy Release Rate (SERR) Approach:
No formal derivations for the SERR will be presented in what follows as the approach is well
established and readily found in the references cited by the bracketed numbers.
The energy rate G (Gdffith energy criterion) can be regarded as the force tending to open the crack,
and its evaluation requires only a knowledge of the stresses and displacements near the crack-tip.
This approach was conceived also in a closed-form [3]. Following Griffith [4]. and Irwin [5], the strain
energy released is the work done in the process of advancing the half-crack length, ao, by an amount
Aa by the stresses acting through the COD displacement (uy) provided that _a is small enough such
that in the limit as t_a ..... 0, the conditions COD(ao) ---- COD(ao + Aa), and Xa ...... Xb are fulfilled
(see Figure 3).
The work done (crack closure as derived by Irwin) at both ends for a two-dimensional crack is,
= 0.._1._.. ayG! 2.1im.8 Aa 2--(Aa Xa,0).Uy.(Xa,rt) dXa Eq. 3.0
.I0
and,
SIF (Mode l) = _;(3/-E-._ (plane stress) Eq. 4.0
e)
E = material elastic modulus of elasticity
n = dimensionless constant that depends on the material strain
hardening exponent n, yield strength, and elastic modulus
(elastic-plastic fracture mechanics). This constant is described
later on tbis section.
Virtual Crack Closure Method via Finite Element Method:
One can employ the concept of virtual crack closure, as described previously, which measures the
work required to close an increment of crack length _,a. The crack closure method allows, using Finite
Element Analysis, to calculate the strain energy release rate by calculating the strain energy at single
crack length. That is, only one Finite Element run with a fixed crack length is required, with the
condition that the nodal pattern in front and behind the crack-tip (CTIP) are identical. In a two-
dimensional, mode I situation, the strain energy release rate can be rewritten as
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I/2 COD
%
!
-x
Figure 3 - SEGMENT OF CRACK OPENING
!
COD
+yl
-yi
+Y
+X
Figure 4 - CALCULATION OF ENERGY RELEASE RATE
BY FINITE ELEMENT METHOD
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where
l
GI = B-2.-dx"
n
Z Fyfuyj
i=l
Eq. 5.0
Fy i = normal component of the nodal forces ahead of the crack-tip
uyj = net crack opening displacement = (uYi)upp¢ r- (uYi)lower
dx = nodes spacing (element length)
B = shell wall thickness or plate thickness
i = node number
j = i - 2 (according to the system shown in Fig. 4)
For a three-nodes spacing (two elements) configuration as shown in Figure 4, Equation 5.0
becomes:
1
GI = 2..B.dx.((Fyyuyl) -_ (FY4.uY2)) Eq. 5.1
Then, the SIF is obtained using Equation 4.0.
f) Strip Yield Model (COD):
Several techniques, both theoretical and experimental, have been taken to establish the relationship
of the crack-tip opening displacement, which is variously called COD, CTOD and 8T to K, J or SIF. In
general, the reported relationships are of the form,
51" = "/F_-E) Eq. 6.0
The coefficient _. takes into account for the variations in the position at which 8T is measured. Its value
ranges from 0.25 to 1.0 [6]. Two common positions, are shown in Figure 5. The crack-tip opening
displacement (CTOD) at position II is frequently used, and a fairly representative value for _. is 0.60.
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g) Path-Independent J- integral (RICE-integral)
James R. Rice [7,8] represented the energy rate as a path-independent line integral taken around the
crack-tip for an homogeneous material as
J
r d '
Eq. 7.0
Here, [" is a curve which surround the crack-tip, starting from the lower fiat notch surface and ending
on the upper flat notch surface, as shown in Figure 6. The curve is traversed in the counterclockwise
sense, s is arc length, and T = (_ N is the traction vector on [" according to an outward unit vector N
normal to the curve. W is the strain energy density (SED), and uy is the displacement in the y-
direction.
Kishimoto et al. [9,10], and Aoki et al. [11], redefined Rice-Integral which consists of a line integral for
the elastic strain energy and four additional area integrals to consider contributions of plastic strains,
thermal strains, inertia forces and body forces, as follows:
tq
j,= dF
o;F
rIA[ d_LJ --Jd iJ
where, A is the area inside the contour F ,W e is the elastic strain energy density, U i the
displacement vector, _ the acceleration vector, Gijthe stress tensor, T i the traction
--),
vector which is defined by T i = (_ij.Nj and _ij is the eigen strain tensor, p the mass
density, and F i the body force vector.
This eigen strain tensor can be regarded as the sum of the plastic and thermal strains.
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Obviously, in cases without inertia force, body force, pressure loading on cracked surface or where
eigen strains are neglected, Eq 7.1 is reduced to Eq.7.0.
The elastic strain energy density (SED) is defined as We = 1/2 x a_j x E=j; using Finite Element
Method, SED can be derived directly from nodal principal stresses ( (_1,_2, _z ), that is,
We = 2/E ( O'x2 + o'y= + O'z2 ) - { v/E ( o"xo'y + o'y O'z + O'xo'z) }
ifthe crack faces are traction free, Eq. 7.0 reducesto Jj = / W, dy
On the Dimensionless Constant Eta (11)
Eq. 8.0
The dimensional constant _ used in Eq. 4.0 is used when one performs an elastic-plastic fracture
mechanics analysis of a cracked structure employing the crack-tip opening displacement (CTOD)
technique (Figure 7) for determining the SIF. This constant exhibits a strong dependence on the
material strain hardening exponent (n) and a mild dependence on the yield strength to elastic modulus
ratio, as shown in Figure 8. Generally, in the fracture mechanics literature, the reciprocal of this
constant (dn = 1 / "q) function of the reciprocal of the strain hardening exponent ( 1 / n ) is plotted [12,
13]. For nonhardening material ( n = eo ) in plane stress, this constant is equal to unity.
SUMMARY ON THE SIF
For simple structure and for Mode I loading, the SIF can be assessed using the following expression,
SIF = C _(=ao) °s° Eq. 9.0
where C is a dimensionless geometry correction factor, and _ is a characteristic stress. Thus,
fracture analysis (EFM) of a linear structure is relatively easy to perform, once a SIF solution is
obtained for a particular crack geometry. Refer to Appendix B for additional known closed form
solutions toward estimating the SIF in through-cracked monolithic cylinders.
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The CTOD Coefficient q is used in the following expressions:
1) SIF = J_/J.E= ,_6T.ao.q-E
where
2) J = 6T.ao.T1 ( J-integral )
ao= Material Tensile Yield Strength = F_,
= Crack Tip Opening Displacement (CTOD)
E = Material Modulus of Elasticity
Figure 8 - PREDICTED J-CTOD RELASTIONSHIPS FOR PLANE STRESS
(CTOD Coefficient q versus Material Strain Hardening Exponent n)
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However, for complex structures and loading conditions, as reinforced-skin pressure vessels, one as
to rely on more sophisticated techniques, as described above and like the ones used in advanced
fracture mechanics (AFM) and nonlinear computational mechanics (NCM). For instance, in cracked
pressure vessels, in addition to the classical Mode I (opening mode) loading, one has to consider the
effect of local crack bulging due to the internal pressure. This problem is addressed next.
AIII-3 NONLINEAR CRACK BULGING EFFECT on the SlF
David Y. Jeong and Pin Tong [14] summarized very well the problem of bulging effect on the SIF of a
cracked pressure vessel. Bulging refers to the rotation and deflection of the edges of a longitudinal
crack in a pressurized thin shell as shown in Figure 9. Its main effect is to introduce local bending at
the crack-tip and therefore affecting the value of the SIF calculated using only the hoop (or normal)
stress to the crack length. However, the bulging factor (_) is employed only when one uses closed
form solution for determining the SIF in curved and unreinforced panels. That is, its applicability is
restricted, somewhat, to simple monocoque isotropic shells.
Bulging factors have been earlier developed empirically by Kuhn [19] and analytically by Folias [1] as
displayed by Eq. 10.0 and Eq. 11.0 respectively.
13 = 1_-10. _ .>-I00 Eq. 10.0
where,
13 = _fl _-0.317._. 2 X - l - v 2) Eq. 11.0
R = shell radius, h = shell wall thickness, ao = half-crack length,
v = Poisson's ratio
A better derivation of this factor using a strain energy approach combined with dimensional analysis,
was proposed by Jeong and Ping [14] as follows:
here, E = material Young's modulus, ao= material tensile yield strength
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Tip-to-Tip
Crack Length,
Crack Tip
(a) TOP VIEW
Crack Tip
Ribs
Face with High Bulging
(b) SIDE VIEW
Face with Low
Bulging next to Rib
Figure 9 - CRACK BULGING TYPICAL SCENARIO
Shown Here is a FEM of the ESA MPLM Shell with a Longitudinal Crack Between Ribs
(Note the Uneven Bulging of the Crack Faces due to the Presence of Ribs)
A-16
MA-TR-101-95
SECTION A
INTERNATIONALSP CESTATIONALPHA
Thus, for curved panels, the crack resistance in terms of SIF rely on 13and Eq. 9.0 is rewritten as
follows,
SIF = C 13 _(_ao) °'s° Eqg.1
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AIII-4 ALUMINUM ALLOY 2219-1"87 MATERIAL FRACTURE TOUGHNESS DATA
As indicated earlier, once one has determined the SIF of a particular cracked body, the assessment of
the level of criticality for catastrophic failure is done by comparing the fracture capability, or fracture
toughness (K) of the material that the body is made off, with the SIF. The difficulty arrises on obtaining
and selecting the appropriate K. Most fracture mechanics work are deterministic; i.e., a single value of
fracture toughness is used to estimate failure loads or critical crack length (CCL). However, as we
know, much of what happens in the real world is not predictable per se. Other factors may also
introduce uncertainty into fracture analyses. It is well known that, the intrinsic problem in designing
large structures involves the extrapolation of strength and reliability data obtained from small coupon
test specimens to values appropriate to the large structure in consideration. Due to these
complexities, fracture should be viewed probabilistically rather than deterministically.
We have researched and reviewed the pertinent literature and test data furnished by NASA (R.
Foreman, JSC [17]) and other sources (Dr. N. Elfer, Martin Marietta [16], and Dr. J. Gallagher,
UDRI/US Air Force [15]) on the fracture toughness of the Aluminum Alloy 2219-T87 that the ESA
MPLM shell structure is made off. Some of the material property data on the AI/AI 2219-T87 is
attached in this report as Appendix A. The gathered data indicated much more scatter in fracture
toughness than anticipated. Therefore, a statistical evaluation of the various parameters affecting the
toughness values was in order. We have used the extreme value (or Weibull) statistical distribution
function, which has been widely applied in materials science and engineering, to the available data. Of
relevance here, is the data published by Gallagher [15], which was reduced as shown in Figure 10.
We have classified two main levels of fracture toughness function of the Weibull reliability R namely: A
and B which represent a lower shelf and upper shelf, respectively, of the data. The performed
statistical analysis indicated a lower shelf mean value of 83.5 KSI-in °s and an upper shelf mean value
of 93.8 KSl-in °5 for the fracture toughness. These values, of course, are applicable to the type of
center cracked tension (CTT) type specimen used for testing with a thickness of 0.100 inch (thin
sheet) and under the state of plane stress conditions; i.e., thicker test specimen (state of plain strain)
will yield much lower values for the fracture toughness.
Next, one has to consider the fracture mode and the type of material utilized. The fracture mode is one
of either brittle cleavage or ductile tearing. For aluminum alloy type of materials, the fracture mode (at
room temperature) is mostly ductile tearing. In addition, one also to take into consideration the effects
of the strain hardening exponent n (discussed previously) on the fracture parameters.
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Figure 10 - WEIBULL FRACTURE TOUGHNESS DISTRIBUTION
for 2219-T87 Aluminum Alloy
( Re.: J. Gallager [15], UDRI, 1983; CCT specimen thickness = 0.100 inch,
width = 48 inch, L-T grain direction )
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Most often, ductile fracture is characterized by a plot of K for EFM or J for EPFM versus ductile crack
extension called the fracture resistance curve or R-curve. Based on the Gallager data, we have
generated the J-R curves for the lower and upper shelves of the 2219-T87 aluminum alloy as
illustrated in Figure 11.
Fracture toughness tests were also performed in 1986-1987 on Center Cracked Tension (CCT)
specimens with a thickness of 0.128 inch and with a width of 24.0 inches of 2219-T87 aluminum alloys
by Dr. Elfer[16]. Based on the test results, R-curves were generated as shown in Figure 12. Finally, in
1993 Southwest Research Institute (SwRI), San Antonio, Texas, conducted limited fracture tests on
the same material [18]. Quasi-static and dynamic fracture toughness values were obtained. The
objective of the SwRI program study was to obtain dynamic toughness and compare it to the quasi-
static one. It was concluded that the quasi-static plane stress toughness J-R curve is lower than the
dynamic plane stress toughness J-R curve. The SwRI J-R curve for the quasi-static regime is shown
in Figure 13.
From the published data by Elfer, and Foreman, we have generated the corresponding Weibull
reliability versus the fracture toughness. A comparison of the K distribution for the three data banks is
shown in Figure 14. One can readily realize the large data scatter for K function of its reliability. At this
point, which data set one will choose for conducting a failure tolerance analysis of a particular
structure made of 2219-T87 aluminum alloy? The answer is that the data scatter is due to test
specimen geometry (width, height and thickness) for one, and secondly on how the K (or SIF) was
derived. Gallager test data was generated with a somewhat large CTT specimen (width = 48.0
inches). Whereas, Elfer test specimen were 24.0 inches in width by 44.0 inches in height with a
thickness of 0.128 inch. Therefore, one can conclude that the size effects are extremely important and
should be taken into account for determining the fracture parameters of a particular material, as
depicted in Figure 15. Note that, all data shown are at room temperature conditions.
Based on the available data for 2219-T87 and on the 5456 series Aluminum Alloys, we have grouped
the fracture toughness and other pertinent data for the ISSA Manned Modules as shown in Table It.
Note that, here, we have selected two values for the fracture toughness, as a function of the module's
wall thickness, at crack initiation & stable growth, and at crack unstable propagation (critical plateau),
respectively. One standard deviation (+/- 1 er ) on the toughness is also listed.
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Figure 11 - J-R CURVES FOR 2219-T87 ALUMINUM ALLOY
- representation of the ductile fracture process -
( Adapted from test data published by J. Gallager [15], UDRI, 1983;
panel thickness = 0.100", panel width = 48.0", L-T grain direction )
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Figure 12 - R-CURVES for 2219-T87 Alumnimum Alloy, L-T Orientation
( Ref.: Dr. N. Elfer, Martin Marietta Manned Space Systems,
Michoud Assembly Facility, New Orleans, LA 70189,
IR&D Report No. $87-47501-001, July 1987 )
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Figure 13 - J-R CURVE for the QUASI-STATIC CCT SPECIMEN
( Adapted from SwRI work-study [18] performed in 1993 with
CCT test specimen of 0.125 inch thick )
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Figure 14 - COMPARISON of the WEIBULL FRACTURE TOUGHNESS DISTRIBUTION
for Three Published Data Bank for 2219-T87 Aluminum Alloy
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Figure 15 - DERIVED J-R CURVES for two CCT TEST SPECIMEN
made of
Aluminum Alloy 2219-T87
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AIV - CRITICAL CRACK LENGTHS
AIV-1 PROLOGUE
This section presents a summary on the analytical study performed and the results obtained on
assessing the Stress Intensity Factor (SIF) function of Crack-Length (CL) for the respective ISSA
habitable modules, and selected high pressure tanks of the Russian FGB module. A combination of
numerical methods, like the Finite Element Method (FEM) and closed form solutions outlined in
Section III, were employed in the study.
For comparative purposes and to determine the spread of the pertinent results, several fracture
criterion were utilized for deriving the SIF. In general, more accurate results on the SlF are obtained
by employing numerical techniques as the FEM by modeling the particular shell of interest with all it's
geometric and construction details, in contrast of published closed form solutions which are applicable
only to unreinforced-skin cylindrical shell structures. We have used essentially two finite element
codes: 1) ALGOR 3D Linear Stress Solution, and 2) ELASTO 2D Elasto-Plastic Plane Stress Solver.
ALGOR is a well-know FEM package, being commercially available for quite some time. The ELASTO
2D FEM computer program was developed, for the stress analysis of plane structure in the elastic-
plastic regime, during the Space Station Freedom Program [20].
Once the stresses at the crack-tip and the crack opening displacements (CTOD, and CMOD) were
obtained for a particular crack length and shell geometry, the SIF was estimated using selected closed
form solutions listed in Section III-B and Section III-C. For this purpose, we have utilized the MathCad
software package that runs under Windows environment. MathCad is a powerful spreadsheets
computer program, and work with formulas, numbers, text, and graphs. Then, the SIF was compared
to the material fracture toughness (K) as outlined in Section Ill-D, function of the shell minimum
thickness and the type of aluminum alloy material that the shell is constructed with, to assess the SIF
in question.
Note that, all analyses were performed under quasi-static (time independent) loading conditions. That
is, the principal driver for crack opening and crack extension is the hoop (circumferential) stress, due
to the internal pressure (14.9 psia) loading.
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AIV-2 UNITED STATES of AMERICA COMMON MODULE (i.e., HAB & LAB)
For the US module we have assessed the SIF for two particular regions of the structure that was
considered critical, namely the main shell with a waftle-skin (orthotropic) design, and one of the End-
Cone's. The employed analytical procedure and pertinent results obtained for the cylindrical shell are
outlined in Section AIV-2.1. Similarly, Section AIV-2.2, address the SIF for the end-cone.
AIV-2.1 MAIN CYLINDRICAL SHELL
The US Common Module Shell overall arrangement with its waffle-skin Design Details are shown in
Figure 16.
We have performed at first, a 3D elastic finite element analysis (FEA) using the ALGOR computer
program of a segment of the module shell wall to determine the stress distribution within the Waffle-
Skin, without cracks, under a 14.9 psia internal pressure loading. Figure 17 illustrates the 3D FEA
model. Figure 18 displays the principal stress distribution within the wall. Then, we have conducted a
plane stress nonlinear elasto-plastic finite element analysis, using our ELASTO code, of a discrete
section of the waffle-skin using a center cracked tension (CCT) analytical specimen as shown in
Figure 19 through Figure 21. This CCT model possess all the features of the Waffle-Skin design,
including the reinforcement at the joints and the fillet radius at the rib to skin intersection. The loading
conditions consisted of the hoop stress and axial stress (biaxial loading conditions) that were obtained
from the 3D FEA. We have performed several computer runs, whereby the crack length was extended
progressively (crack growth by unzipping of nodes), from the waffle-skin cell center-line to the rib joint.
The resulting crack-tip (CTIP) opening displacements (CTOD) and crack mouth opening
displacements (CMOD), as illustrated in Figure 22, were recorded and catalogued as functions of the
crack length. The data was then stored in a file that can be retrieved and used with the MathCad
program.
We have here, utilized three fracture criterion for assessing the SIF, two of which are applicable to
through the wall cracks in pressure vessels. They are displayed in Figure 23 and have all in common
the crack bulging factor ( _ ) due to internal pressure. However, Folias and Jeong & Tong criterion
uses Linear Elastic Fracture Mechanics (LEFM) principles, and applies to monolithic and isotropic
shells only, whereas MA-1 parameter uses the CTOD and J contour integral developed by Rice.
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Figure 16 - US COMMON MODULE SHELL and WAFFLE-SKIN DESIGN DETAILS
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Shell with a Stiffened Waffle-Skin Construction
Internal Radius = 83.0 inch
Pressure Wall Minimum Thickness, h = 0.188 inch
Waffle-Grid Pitch Spacing = 20.95 inch (axial & circumferential)
Rib Height and Thickness = 1.00 x 0.90 inch
Material: Alumninum Alloy 2219-T87
Figure 17 - US COMMON MODULE SHELL 3D FINITE ELEMENT 1/4 (90°) MODEL
OVERALL ARRANGEMENT - TOP VIEW
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Figure 18 - US COMMON MODULE SHELL 3D FEA 1/4 (90 ° ) MODEL
PRINCIPAL STRESS (Psi) DISTRIBUTION
(At anlnternal Pressure of 14.9 psia and Axial Blow Out Load)
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Figure 19 - CCT FLAT PLATE ANALYTICAL SPECIMEN OVERALL CONFIGURATION
for the US MODULE SHELL WAFFLE-SKIN
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Figure 20 - CCT FLAT PLATE ANALYTICAL SPECIMEN for the US MODULE WAFFLE-SKIN
PRIOR TO FINITE ELEMENT MESHING
(A Quarter Model was only necessary due to symmetry)
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Figure 21 - CCT FLAT PLATE ANALYTICAL SPECIMEN for the US MODULE WAFFLE-SKIN
PLANE STRESS ELASTO-PLASTIC FINITE ELEMENT MODEL
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Figure 22 - CCT FLAT PLATE ANALYTICAL SPECIMEN for the US MODULE WAFFLE-SKIN
2D PLANE STRESS ELASTO-PLASTIC FEA RESULTS
CRACK OPENING DISPLACEMENT vs. CRACK LENGTH
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Figure 23 - CCT FLAT PLATE ANALYTICAL SPECIMEN for the US MODULE WAFFLE-SKIN
2D PLANE STRESS ELASTO-PLASTIC FEA RESULTS
STRESS INTENSITY FACTORS vs. CRACK LENGTH
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It is worth to reiterate here, that LEFM is valid only as long as nonlinear material deformation is
confined to a small region surrounding the CTIP ([12] and [13]). The COD and J-integral parameters
describe CTIP conditions in elastic-plastic materials, and each can be used as a fracture criterion
(See Section AIII-2). Critical values of CTOD or J, employing elastic-plastic fracture (EPFM), give
nearly size-independent assessment of the SIF, even for large amounts of CTIP plasticity. EPFM
applies to materials that exhibit time-independent, nonlinear behavior (i.e., plastic deformation).
Also note that, using FEM for modeling a particular cracked structure (i.e., as shown in Figure 22), the
CTIP is a stress concentration in a mesh and strain and stress gradients can be very large as the
CTIP is approached. This means that the FEM mesh must be refined as the CTIP is approached.
However, the CTOD and/or the J-integral is an energy measure and with "surprisingly" coarse meshes
accurate J values can be obtained, even though the local stress and strain fields are not quite
accurate.
Having assessed the SIF function of CL for the US module cylindrical shell waffle-skin, the CCL can
be evaluated by comparing the material that the shell is made off (Aluminum Alloy 2219-T87) fracture
toughness (K) to the SIF. The estimated values for K for the material and specific minimum thickness
(0.188 inch) and under quasi-static conditions, were tabulated in Table II, Section AIII-4. At crack
initiation and stable crack growth, K = 62 KSI-in °5, and at the unstable crack propagation, K = 87 KSI-
in°5, with a standard deviation (+\- 1 c_)of 6.7 KSI-in °s.
Using the CCT analytical specimen, the maximum estimated SIF for the MA-1 criterion, was near 80
KSI-in °s for a tip-to-tip crack length of 17.5 inch, as shown in Figure 23. A slight decay on the SIF can
be observed as the CTIP approaches the ribs joint. In essence, the waffle-grid joints (with their added
stiffness), and the fillet radius at the rib root, tends to act as crack-stoppers. Based on the above, the
respective CCL for the US common module cylindrical shell waffle-skin were estimated to be:
CRACK PROPAGATION
CONDITIONS
..........................................
Stable Initiation & Growth
Unstable (Critical)
AROUND the MEAN VALUE
12.8 inch
N/A
MINUS ONE STANDARD
DEVIATION
10.7 inch
17.5 inch
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AIV-2.2 SHELL END CONE
For a conical shell under internal pressure, the driver for the SIF at the CTIP is, as per the cylindrical
shell, the hoop loading. However, here, the hoop stress is proportional to the local radius and skin
thickness (both variable), and the cone half-angle (a constant) as illustrated by the accompanying
sketch. Consequently, this driver continuously changes, likewise the corresponding SIF at the CTIP,
as the CTIP progress from the cone smaller diameter (near the cone apex) toward the larger diameter
at the base of the cone. Thus, one has to assess the CCL for this particular structure, by considering
two CTIP function of the CL and its particular location along the cone wall. We have designated CTIP-
A for the upper-most crack tip (North), and CTIP-B for the lower one (South).
L
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c¢= 65 °
We have performed a 3D FEA of a segment of the US module end cone (quarter segment = 90 °)
shown in Figure 24, having an axial through-the-wall crack, under a 14.9 psia internal pressure
loading. Note that, the end cone FEM includes the reinforcing North and South rings (see sketch
above) and gussets, in addition to the variable thickness within the gore panel. Figure 25 depicts the
global 3D FEM with the crack located within the cone Pressure wall minimum thickness of 0.188 inch,
and the ensuing principal stress (psi) distribution for a chosen crack length.
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Figure 24 - US COMMON MODULE END CONE OVERALL ARRANGEMENT
(Ref. BOEING, Seattle, WA 98124- DWG. No.. 683-11211, Rev B, 94-03-21)
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Figure 25 - US COMMON MODULE END CONE 3D FEA 1/4 (90°) MODEL
with an Axial Crack (Lo= 8 inch) within the Region of Minimum Thickness (0.188")
Shown are the Maximum Bending Principal Stress (psi) Distribution and
Overall displacement (magnified 30 time) at 14.9 psia pressure loading
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From the resulting crack opening displacements, and principal stress (as shown in Figure 26 for a
particular CL) at the crack tips A and B, we have utilized five (5) fracture criterion to assess the
corresponding SIF. They are displayed graphically in Figure 27 and Figure 28, for the North CTIP and
in Figure 29 for the South CTIP, respectively. They have all in common the crack bulging effects due
to the internal pressure. The significant results here is that the CTIP-A is the most stressed one.
However, as the CTIP-A approaches the end of the 0.188" thick zone of the wall, and encounters
another zone with a higher thickness (0.230"), the SIF will be reduced, therefore limiting further crack
extension. Thus, the maximum possible CCL (local unzipping) will be confined to the gore panel (see
Figure 16)with a span of 18.3 inch.
The conservative CCL's, based on the CTIP-A SIF and on the fracture toughness for 0.188 inch thick
2219-T87 Aluminum Alloy, were assessed, under quasi-static loading conditions, to be:
CRACK PROPAGATION AROUND the MEAN VALUE MINUS ONE STANDARD
CONDITIONS DEVIATION
Stable Initiation & Growth 5.7 inch 4.4 inch
Unstable (Critical) 12.5 inch 10.4 inch
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Figure 26 - US COMMON MODULE END CONE 3D FEA 1/4 (90°) MODEL
with an Axial Crack (Lo= 8 inch) within the Region of Minimum Thickness (0.188")
Shown are The Maximum Stress Distribution around the Cracked Region and
Overall displacement (magnified 30 time) at 14.9 psia pressure loading
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3. FOLIAS, SIF = Equation 1.0
4. COD, SIF = Equation 6.0
5. J & T, SIF = Equation 9.1
(see Section AIII-2)
Figure 27 - US COMMON MODULE END CONE
CTIP-A (North) Stress Intensity Factor (SIF) for Crack Length between 4 and 8 inches
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Figure 28 - US COMMON MODULE END CONE
Interpolated CTIP-A (North) Stress Intensity Factor vs. Crack Length
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Figure 29 - US COMMON MODULE END CONE
Interpolated CTIP-B (South) Stress Intensity Factor (SlF) for Crack Length
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AIV-3 EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY (ESA) MPLM COLUMBUS MODULE
We have adopted the similar analytical procedure, for the ESA module, as per the one employed for
the US module. We have assessed the SIF's for two main regions of the structure. Section AIV-3.1
summarizes the work done for evaluating the SIF within the MPLM cylindrical shell Isogrid reinforced
pressure wall. Section AIV-3.2 treats the SIF for one of the module end cone.
AIV-3.1 MAIN CYLINDRICAL SHELL
The ESA MPLM Module Structure general arrangement is exhibited in Figure 30.
A 3D FEA model of a quarter segment of the Isogrid shell was developed with a longitudinal crack
within one cell region, as shown from Figure 31 through Figure 33. Several computer runs were
performed, whereby the crack length was progressively extended, under internal pressure of 14.9 psia
loading. A typically resulting crack opening displacement and local crack length bulging effects are
displayed in Figure 34. Note here, the non-uniformity of the COD along the crack length. Reduced
COD can be seen at the boundary of the cracked-edge near the longitudinal rib. Essentially, this
particular analysis was done in order to determine the bulging effects within the cracked region
because of the internal pressure.
Subsequently, we have conducted a plane stress nonlinear elasto-plastic FEA, using the ELASTO
program, of a local region of the Isogrid reinforced skin, using a CCT analytical model as depicted in
Figure 35 and Figure 36. This CCT model has all the design details of the Isogrid skin cells and ribs.
The main loading conditions consisted of the hoop stress and the axial blow-out load. Basically, the
biaxial loading conditions, usually encountered in a pressure vessel. Several computer runs were
done, in which the crack length was extended progressively, frown the cell centerline toward the end
of the CCT edge (see Figure 36). For each crack length, the resulting CMOD, CTOD, and CTIP
stresses were tabulated. The data was then stored in a file that can be retrieved and used by the
MathCad software.
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Figure 30 - ESA MPLM "COLUMBUS" MODULE GENERAL ARRANGEMENT
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InternalRadius=83.00inch
ShellThickness=0.118Inch
RibHeightandThickness= 1.06 x 0.118 Inch
Isogrid Pitch = 13.11 inch
Internal Pressure Loading = 14.9 psia
Mat'l = Aluminurna Alloy 2219-T87
Cracked Region
(W_thin a isogrid cell)
Figure 31 - ESA MPLM CYLINDRICAL SHELL 3D FEA 1/4 (90°) MODEL
TOP VIEW
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Figure 32 - ESA MPLM CYLINDRICAL SHELL 3D FEA 114 (90°) MODEL
DETAILS of the ISOGRID PRESSURE WALL
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Artificially
Cracked Region
Section Modeled with
a Skin Having The
Equivalent
Isogrid Cell Stiffness
Section Modeled with
Isogrid Cells
Figure 33 - ESA MPLM CYLINDRICAL SHELL 3D FEA 114(90°) MODEL
SIDE VIEW
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Figure 34 - ESA MPLM CYLINDRICAL SHELL 3D FEA 114(90°) MODEL
CRACK DISPLACEMENT and BULGING DETAILS
(magnified 50 times for clarity; crack length, Lo= 9.5")
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Figure 35 - ESA MPLM CYLINDRICAL SHELL with an ISOGRID REINFORCED SKIN
CCT FLAT PLATE ANALYTICAL SPECIMEN
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Figure 36 - ESA MPLM CYLINDRICAL SHELL with an ISOGRID REINFORCED SKIN
CCT ELASTO-PLASTIC 2D PLANE STRESS FINITE ELEMENT MODEL
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Using the relevant data, we have employed five (5) fracture criterion for estimating the SIF's. The
results are displayed in Figure 37, along with the respective SIF parameter. Folias and Jeong & Tong
parameters are for unreinforced CCT specimen. MA-3 criterion uses the CMOD, and it is considered
to be to conservative. MA-1 & MA-2 parameters are identical, and uses the J-integral principle
developed by Rice. All five criterion includes the bulging effects. Note that, from Figure 36 and Figure
37, the resulting SIF's above a crack length of approximately 7.0 inch, assumes that the ribs around
one cell have been precracked by other means other than the biaxial loading condition. Based on the
results shown in Figure 37, the CCL will be confined within one cell, obviously, only if the initial
damage done by M/OD impact is confined locally within the cell and not damaging in the process the
adjacent ribs.
In summary, the estimated CCL for the ESA MPLM module cylindrical shell with an Isogrid reinforced
skin, and under the 14.9 psia internal pressure loading are shown below.
CRACK PROPAGATION
CONDITIONS
Stable Initiation & Growth
Unstable (Critical)
AROUND the MEAN
9.8 inch
15.2 inch
MINUS ONE STANDARD
DEVIATION
9.2 inch
13.6 inch
AIV-3.2 SHELL END CONE
The ESA MPLM end cone overall design is shown in Figure 38. The main pressure wall is reinforced
with integral ribs located inside to the cone. A 3D FEA model of the cone and its inner and outer rings
was developed as depicted in Figure 39. Then, we have introduced an axial crack within the region of
maximum hoop stress, as displayed in Figure 40. Several computer runs were performed, whereby
the crack length was progressively extended. For each FEA run with a particular crack length, we
have recorded the crack-tips (A and B, or North Side and South Side respectively) principal stresses
(_x, ay, o'z. A typical maximum stress distribution around the crack-tips is shown in Figure 41. From
the FEA results we have computed the Strain Energy Density (SED) directly from nodal (CTIP)
principal stresses, and the relevant CTOD and CMOD. By using nodal strain energy densities, the
expectation is that the energies will be more accurate than the element-based energies. Having
defined the SED, we have used the J-integral to derive the SIF for the respective CTIP and CL. The
results are displayed in Figure 42.
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Figure 37 - ESA MPLM CYLINDRICAL SHELL with an ISOGRID REINFORCED SKIN
SIF vs. CRACK LENGTH for FIVE SIF CRITERION
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Figure 38 - ESA MPLM MODULE END CONE DESIGN DETAILS
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Cone Design Details:
Height: 17.36" (Outer to Inner Rings)
Outer Radius: 83.07"
Inner Radius: 48.00"
Minimum Pressure Wall Thickness: 0.098"
Internal Ribs Height and Thickness: 0.748" x 0.098"
Half Cone Angle: 65°
Material: Aluminum Alloy 2219-T87
Figure 39 - ESA MPLM MODULE END CONE 3D FEA 1/4 (90 °) MODEL
OVERALL ARRANGEMENT WITHOUT AN ARTIFICIAL CRACK
(IBternal Pressure + Blow Out Load Vectors at 14.9 psisa)
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Figure 40 - ESA MPLM MODULE END CONE 3D FEA 1/4 (90o) MODEL
with an ARTIFICIAL CRACK within a WAFFLE-GRID CELL
(Inside View)
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_;ViEW 4.12 Rle:ceso20 g5/06/21 11:46 LC 1/ 1 Vu=U7 Lo=
Left Hand CTIP = Upper (or North) CTIP-A
Right Hand CTIP = Lower (or South) CTIP-B
(Crack Length, Lo= 60 inches)
Figure 41 - ESA MPLM MODULE END CONE 3D FEA 1/4 (90°) MODEL
PRINCIPAL STRESS DISTRIBUTION (psi) around the CRACKED REGION
(at 14.9 psia internal pressure loading)
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= Strain Energy Density
C = a constant (may include n, the SHE)
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A = Upper Crack-Tip Located at the Pressure Wall and Rib Intersection
B = Lower Crack-Tip Located before Pressure Wall and Rib Intersection
Figure 42 - ESA MPLM END CONE with an AXIAL CRACK within a WAFFLE-GRID CELL
CRACK TIPS (A & B) STRESS INTENSITY FACTORS (SIF) vs. CRACK LENGTH
(at 14.9 psia internal pressure loading)
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For comparative purposes, we have also utilized two additional fracture parameters, developed by
Folias and Jeong & Tong, for through the wall cracks in pressure vessels. Figure 43 shows the results
of this comparison. Note that, the fracture criterion by Folias and Jeong & Tong are applicable to
isotropic shells only. Nevertheless, they were employed so that to verify the order of magnitude of our
calculated SIF's.
From the estimated values of fracture toughness of 2219-T87 Aluminum Alloy with a minimum
thickness of 0.098 inch (see Section AIII-4, TABLE II), and from the results of the SIF shown in Figure
42, we have assessed the corresponding CCL for the ESA MPLM under quasi-static loading
conditions, as summarized below.
CRACK PROPAGATION CRACK-TIP AROUND the MEAN MINUS ONE STANDARD
CONDITIONS DEVIATION
Stable Initiation & Growth A 5.3 inch 3.7 inch
B 7.0 inch 4.2 inch
Unstable (Critical) A N/A N/A
B 7.7 inch 7.5 inch
N/A = Not Applicable
The significant results of this study for the ESA MPLM end cone structure criticality to fracture
indicated that the CCL is confined to one cell spacing only. As shown in Figure 42, a pronounced
decay on the SIF is observed as the CTIP-A (North Crack) approaches an internal rib. The ribs acts
essentially as crack-stoppers. In brief, the CCL here is irrelevant, as far as the unzipping issue is
concerned, if one confines the CL within one cell only.
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Figure 43- ESA MPLM END CONE with an AXIAL CRACK within a WAFFLE-GRID CELL
CRACK-TIP "A" SIF COMPARISON vs. CRACK LENGTH
for THREE DIFFERENT ANALYTICAL METHODS
(at 14.9 psia internal pressure loading)
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AIV-4 JAPAN SPACE AGENCY (NASDA) JEM PM LAB MODULE
The JEM LAB module overall design arrangement is displayed in Figure 44. At first, a 3D finite
element model of a 1/4 segment of the shell Isogrid stiffened pressure wall (without any cracks) of the
shell was developed as shown in Figure 45. The model was run with the ALGOR code for an elastic
solution to determine the stress distribution within the Isogrid skin under a 14.9 psia internal pressure
loading, as illustrated in Figure 46. The resulting principal stress distribution throughout the system is
shown in Figure 47. Next, we have conducted a plane stress nonlinear elasto-plastic finite element
analysis, using the ELASTO FEA code, of a discrete section of the Isogrid wall using a center
cracked tension (CCT) analytical specimen as depicted in Figure 48 through Figure 50. This CCT
model possess all the features of the Isogrid stiffened skin design, in particular the reinforcement at
the ribs joint. The CCT loading conditions consisted of the hoop and axial average principal stresses
(biaxial loading) obtained from the 3D FEA model. Several iterations were made, whereby the crack
length (here, half-crack length, ao) by finite increments. The resulting crack-tip (CTIP) opening
displacements (CTOD), and crack mouth opening displacements (CMOD),as shown in Figure 51,
were catalogued and saved in a file that can be used by the MathCad software. For this structure, we
have utilized three fracture criterion to assess the stress intensity factor at the CTIP. They are
graphically displayed in Figure 52, with the respective criteria listed. They have all in common the
crack bulging effects due to the internal pressure. However, Folias and Jeong & Tong criterion are for
monolithic and isotropic type of shell, whereas MA-1 criterion uses the J-integral principle along with
the corresponding pertinent results obtained from the CCT specimen. The SIF function of the crack
length indicated a maximum SIF of about 100 KSI-in °s for a 16 inch tip-to-tip crack length. A slight
decay on the SIF can be observed in Figure 52 (see also Figure 53, point B) when the CTIP
approaches a joint. In essence, the joints, with they added stiffness, tends to act as crack-stoppers.
The significant results of this study on the JEM PM module criticality to fracture suggest that the CCL
is approximately 16 inches, if one assumes that one hoop-rib is ruptured by an M/OD impact.
Otherwise, the CCL is irrelevant if one confines the CL within one cell only. Based on the above
findings and on the allowable 2219-T87 fracture toughness with a thickness of 0.126 inch (see
TABLE II, Section AIII-4), the estimated CCL for this module are as follows:
CRACK PROPAGATION CONDITIQN$
Stable Initiation & Growth
Unstable (Critical)
AROUND theMEAN VALUE
12.0 inches
N/A
MINUS ONE STD. DEVIATION
10.0 inches
15.3 inches
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Figure 44 - NASDA JEM PM STRUCTURE GENERAL ARRANGEMENT
(dimensions shown are in millimeters)
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Reinforced Skin with a Isogrid
Construction
Internal Radius = 83.0 inch
Shell Thickness within Cells = 0.126 inch
Isogrid Spacing: axial = 10.51 inch
hoop = 12.136 inch
Rib Height & Thickness -'- 1.0 x 0.079 inch
Internal Pressure = 14.9 psia
Material: Atuminum Alloy 2219-T87
Figure 45 - NASDA JEM PM CYLINDRICAL SHELL 3D FEA 1/4 (90°) SEGMENT
MODEL PERSPECTIVE VIEW
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CELLS
Figure 46 - NASDA JEM PM CYLINDRICAL SHELL 3D FEA 114(90°) SEGMENT
MODEL TOP VIEW
(Intemal Pressure and Axial Blow Out Loading )
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SVIEW JemgS/D4/24
Figure 47 - NASDA JEM PM CYLINDRICAL SHELL 3D FEA 1/4 (90°) SEGMENT
MODEL VVITHOUT a CRACK - PRINCIPAL STRESS (psi) DISTRIBUTION
( Internal Pressure and Axial Blow Out Load (biaxial loading) at 14.9 psia )
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Figure 48 - NASDA JEM PM CYLINDRICAL SHELL ISOGRID STIFENNED SKIN
CCT FLAT PLATE ANALYTICAL SPECIMEN
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Figure 49 - NASDA JEM PM CYLINDRICAL SHELL ISOGRID STIFENNED SKIN
CCT FLAT PLATE 1/4 ANALYTICAL MODEL
(Reduced Size due to Symmetry and Prior to Finite Elements Meshing)
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Figure 50 - NASDA JEM PM CYLINDRICAL SHELL ISOGP, ID STIFENNED SKIN
CCT FLAT PLATE
PLANE STRESS ELASTO-PLASTIC FINITE ELEMENT MODEL
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Figure 51 - NASDA JEM PM CYLINDRICAL SHELL ISOGRID STIFENNED SKIN
CCT PLANE STRESS ELASTO-PLASTIC FINITE ELEMENT ANALYSIS RESULTS
CRACK OPENING DISPLACEMENTS (COD) vs. HALF-CRACK LENGTH (ao)
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Figure 52 - NASDA JEM PM CYLINDRICAL SHELL ISOGRID STIFENNED SKIN
CCT PLANE STRESS ELASTO-PLASTIC FINITE ELEMENT ANALYSIS RESULTS
STRESS INTENSITY FACTORS (SIF) vs. HALF-CRACK LENGTH (ao)
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Figure 53 - NASDA JEM PM CYLINDRICAL SHELL ISOGRID STIFENNED SKIN
CCT PLANE STRESS ELASTO-PLASTIC FINITE ELEMENT ANALYSIS
COD and CRACK-TIP CRITICAL LOCATIONS (see Figure 52)
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AIV-5 RUSSIAN FGB (SPACE TUG) PROPULSION MODULE
Initially, a 3D elastic finite element analysis of a segment of the shell without any cracked region within
the pressure wall, was performed to determine the stress distribution within the waffle-skin, under an
internal pressure loading of 14.9 psia. The overall FEA model is shown in Figure 54 along with
pertinent design details, also illustrated in Figure 55, with the pressure loading shown in Figure 56.
The resulting principal stress distribution within the shell is displayed Figure 57. Then, we have
conducted a plane stress nonlinear elastic-plastic finite element analysis of a discrete section of the
shell wall with a center cracked tension (CCT) specimen shown in Figure 58. The FEA model is
displayed in Figure 59, which consists only of a quarter of the CTT, due to geometric symmetry. The
CCT model has all the features and characteristics of the waffle-skin design; that is, fillet radius
adjacent to the rib root at the pressure wall, and rib equivalent stiffness were incorporated in the FEA
model. Several iterations were made, using the computer code ELASTO, in which the crack length
was extended by finite increments. The ensuing crack displacements (CTOD and CMOD),, as
displayed in Figure 60, were recorded and inputted into the MathCad software program for post
processing. We have mainly selected four fracture criterion for assessing the SIF of interest. They are
displayed graphically in Figure 61 with the corresponding criterion listed. They have all in common the
crack bulging effects due to the internal pressure. However, Folias and Jeong & Tong parameters are
for isotropic cylindrical shell and plate, respectively, whereas MA-1 and MA-2 uses the FEA results
along with the J-integral criterion. In Figure 61, we have designated three points, whereby the CTIP
SIF display a discontinuity. In point A, as the CTIP approaches a rib, the SIF decreases substantially.
In point B, we have artificially precracked two ribs, so that the crack length could be extended. Here,
the SIF jump to a higher level. As the CTIP progresses toward another rib, again the SIF drops
dramatically. This event is illustrated by point C, in Figure 61. This crack growth scenario is illustrated
in Figure 62. Essentially, the integrally machined ribs of the waffle-skin tends to act as crack-stoppers.
Moreover, limited test data indicated the unit propagation energy of the Aluminum Alloy 5456-0 used
for the shell construction is in the order of 1000 in-lbf/in2 which is, for example, about three times
higher than the 2219-T87 AI/AI. The unit propagation energy, is the energy required to extend the
crack to specimen fracture divided by the net cross section. Based on the confined data, we have
chosen a fracture toughness of 80 KSI-in°s as the median value for the 5456-0 AI/AI (see Figure 61).
The important results of this assessment on the criticality for the Russian TUG shell to unzip, indicated
it will be very difficult to propagate a through-the-wall axial crack within the waffle-skin under 14.9 psia
pressure loading alone, and for this particular shell design and selected material. Other damage
conditions must prevail in order to "unzip" the shell catastrophically.
A-74
MA-TR-101-95
SECTION A
INTERNATIONALSP CESTATIONALPHA
FGB PROPULSION MODULt ',
with
I
DEPLOYED
Reinforced Pressure Wall with
a Waffle-Grid Construction
Internal Radius = 52.6 inch
Wall Thickness within Cells = 0.063 inch
Rib Height & Thickness = 0.894 x 0.157 inch
Ribs Spacing = 2.764 inch (centedines)
Internal Pressure = 14.9 psia -7
Mat'l: Aluminum Alloy 5456-0
R
3D FINITE ELEMENT MODEL
Figure 64 - RUSSIAN FGB (SPACE TUG) CYLINDRICAL SHELL
3D FINITE ELEMENT 1/4 (90°) MODEL of a SECTION of the WAFFLE GRID REINFORCED SKIN
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Figure 55 - RUSSIAN FGB (SPACE TUG) CYLINDRICAL SHELL
WAFFLE GRID REINFORCED SKIN DESIGN DETAILS
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Figure 56 - RUSSIAN FGB (SPACE TUG) CYLINDRICAL SHELL
3D FEA MODEL with INTERNAL PRESSURE LOADING
(Note Ribs are External to the Shell Pressure Wall)
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Figure 57 - RUSSIAN FGB (SPACE TUG) CYLINDRICAL SHELL WITHOUT A CRACK
PRINCIPAL STRESS (psi) DISTRIBUTION at 14.9 psia INTERNAL PRESSURE
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Figure 58 - RUSSIAN FGB CYLINDRICAL SHELL WAFFLE-GRID RENFORCED SKIN
CCT FLAT PLATE ANALYTICAL SPECIMEN
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Figure 59 - RUSSIAN FGB CYLINDRICAL SHELL WAFFLE-GRID RENFORCED SKIN
CCT FLAT PLATE PLANE STRESS ELASTO-PLASTIC FEA MODEL
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Crack
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CTOD = Crack Tip Opening Displacement
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Figure 60 - RUSSIAN FGB CYLINDRICAL SHELL WAFFLE-GRID RENFORCED SKIN
CCT FLAT PLATE PLANE STRESS ELASTO-PLASTIC FEA RESULTS
CRACK OPENING DISPLACEMENTS (COD) vs. HALF-CRACK LENGTH
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Figure 61 - RUSSIAN FGB CYLINDRICAL SHELL WAFFLE-GRID RENFORCED SKIN
CCT FLAT PLATE PLANE STRESS ELASTO-PLASTIC FEA RESULTS
STRESS INTENSITY FACTORS (SIF) vs. HALF-CRACK LENGTH
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Figure 62 - RUSSIAN FGB CYLINDRICAL SHELL WAFFLE-GRID RENFORCED SKIN
CCT PLANE STRESS ELASTO-PLASTIC FEA MODEL
SIF and CRACK-TIP (CTIP) CRITICAL LOCATIONS
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AIV-6 RUSSIAN FGB SPACE TUG AUXILIARY TANKS
A rapid assessment of the critical crack length (CCL) of two FGB propulsion module auxiliary tanks
was performed to determine the criticality to fracture under internal quasi-static pressure. The
pressure vessels considered were the propellant tank and the GN2 spherical bottle.
Here, we have used mainly two fracture criterion, namely: 1) Folias closed form solution [1], and 2)
Jeong & Tong [14] modified parameter by Lutz. Both includes bulging effects due to the internal
pressure.
The pertinent results are shown in Figure 63 for the propellant tank, and in Figure 64 for the GN2
bottle. Conservative values (lower shelf) were used for the fracture toughness at crack instability, for
the respective material employed for these vessels construction.
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Russ/an FGB auxilla__ tanks, critical crack lenoth_
1) propellant tank - Material = Alu/Magnesium, 5XXX series
pl =233.0 hl :=0.098 DI :=18.9 El :=10200000.0 al :=0.67 i:=I..6
KI i_=80.0 aly:=42000.0 n:=50 oily.El-I=0.004 _I =I.01
al i :
.-O-5"
."?F"
-U-.
T_
-TT
I 2 pl.Dl
SIFI i: 2.-__-h-Thl.l_li.,,_.ali.rlI.I000-
r I 2 __0.5
_pI'D1 _j J (all) J J I 0.5"D1
sifFi 2..hl _"='i'Ll _- 3.22._|J .1000-t J_ hl--= 96.429
Note: SIF results shown includes crack bulging effects due to internal pressure
150
Stress
Intensity SIFI i 100
Factor (SIF) s-_ i
(KSI- _ ) Kli
50
I I I I I
Folias
I I I I I
0.5 I 1.5 2 2.5
ali.2
Tip-to-Tip Crack Length, 2a c (inches)
Significant Results: the critical crack-length at 233 psia pressure loading for this tank is:
Lc (Lutz) = 2.7 inches for a Material Fracture Toughness of 80 KSI-in °.s
( conservative lower shelf for crack instability )
Figure 63 - RUSSIAN FGB (SPACE TUG) AUXILIARY TANKS
PROPELLANT TANK CRITICAL CRACK LENGTH
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Russian FGB auxilia_ tanks, critical crack lenoths
2) G N2 Spherical Bottle - Material = Ti-6AI-4Va
h2 :=0.217 D2 = 16.535 p2 :=3343.0 K2j := 120. o2y = 130000.0
I 0.03 'q2 = 1.0-- =E2 = 16000000.0 o2y.E! -! =0.013 n :=33 (RT) n
j --I_6
a_:
.-I-
T
.'3-
i,.
r
!
J
_2j ::il i]21+al. _-_ "O.-N--_.D2 _ p2.D2 132j.._.T12." J I000-14.h2
o.,.°2sit,25 p2.D2 [ (a2j)2 0.5: ..h2 1000' h2-- = 38.099
Note: SIF results shown includes crack bulging effects due to internal pressure
2oo
150
Stress SIF2j
Intensity si°lE2Fj Ioo
Factor (SIF) _:2j
(KSI- ,_)
50
I I I
Follas
Er
• I I I
0 0.5 l 1.5
2.a2j
Tip-to-Tip Crack Length, 2ac (inches)
Significant Results: the critical crack-length at 3343 psia pressure loading for this tank is;
L c (Lutz) = 1.4 inches for a Material Fracture Toughness of 120 KSI-in °.s
( conservative lower shelf for crack instability)
Figure 64 - RUSSIAN FGB (SPACE TUG) AUXILIARY TANKS
GN2 SPHERICAL BOTTLE CRITICAL CRACK LENGTH
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AIV-7 RUSSIAN RESEARCH MODULE SPHERICAL END CONE
As per the FGB auxiliary tanks, an estimate of the CCL of the Russian Research Module Spherical
End Cone was performed, employing closed form solutions.
Figure 65 shows the Stress Intensity Factor (SIF) versus the tip-to-tip crack length for the structure
when subjected to an internal pressure of 14.7 psia. Two fracture criterion were used, namely the
Folias and the Newman parameters, as indicated in the Figure.
The thickness of the spherical end cone is approximately 0.256 inch. For this thickness, one as to
consider the plain strain fracture toughness (fracture resistance capability) of the material, rather than
the state of plain stress. We do not have any data for the Aluminum Alloy 5456-0 for this condition.
However, based on other types of Aluminum Alloys, we can assume a conservative level of 50 KSI-
in°s°, for which yields a CCL of approximately 22 to 23 inches.
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S Dhedcal Cone Dimensions: Internal Radius (R I) = 2.6 m (102.36 inch)
Thickness (h) = 6.6 mm (0.256 inch)
Mat'l: Aluminum Alloy 5456-0 (assumed)
SIF =
I
2.0"hP'Rm 2.0"_-h,_n-Ta• 1.0 t 3.22.
p'l_ m ____
SIF = _.._.a.F
(Folias)
(Newman)
R m = RI + hi2 (inch)
a = half-crack length (inch)
p = intemal pressure (psia)
Stress
Intensity
Factor,
SIF
',KSI._/in)
150
I00
S1Fi
5O
I I I I I I I I
Folias
- _ Newman
I I I I I
5 I0 15 20 25
2..t i
I 1 I
30 35 40 45
Tip-to-Tip Crack Length, Lo (inches)
Figure 65 - RUSSIAN RESEARCH MODULE SPHERICAL END CONE
SlF vs. CRACK LENGTH at 14.7 psia INTERNAL PRESSURE LOADING
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AV - CONCLUSIONS and RECOMMENDATIONS
AM-1 CONCLUSIONS
The principal goal and objectives, of this limited effort summarized in this section, were to determine
with a certain degree of confidence, the criticality for the International Space Station Alpha (ISSA)
selected habitable modules to "unzip" catastrophically if they are subjected to Micrometeoroids and
Orbital Debris (M/OD) cloud impact and subsequent module wall penetration.
As indicated in the body of this report, the primary loading condition for assessing the criticality to
fracture, is the tensile loading carried in the skin of a pressurized module, which can cause an existing
or induced through-the-skin crack to grow in an abrupt fashion (i.e., "unzipping"), if the initial flaw
length exceeds a certain length called the critical crack length (CCL).
The analytical methods employed in this study were based on advanced fracture mechanics (AFM)
principles (i.e., nonlinear elastic-plastic, and pressure effects), and numerical methods such as the
finite element. Several fracture criterion were considered during this work, to ensure compatibility and
relative accuracy of the analytical procedure for assessing the CCL for the respective ISSA modules.
However, the available closed-form solutions for determining the stress intensity factor (SIF) at a
crack tip (CTIP) have some shortcomings, in particular when applied to reinforced pressure wall
(orthotropic) design. Although, these solutions includes sometime effects of geometric nonlinearity and
crack bulging due to the internal pressure, they are not quite applicable to complex pressure wall
design, as the ones for example, used for the ISSA habitable modules. Nevertheless, they were used
in the study (as indicated above) for comparative purposes only. The most applicable fracture criterion
for these type of vessels is the J-integral coupled with the finite element analysis (FEA) of the
pressure wall design in consideration.
The analysis concentrated mainly on two principal stages of the CCL: 1) the quasi-static stable (no
dynamic effects, i.e., due to inertia and/or time dependent loading effects) crack growth (crack starter
& arrest), and 2) quasi-static, unstable crack growth. The first stage is the prediction of the crack
length (CL) at initiation. Such a crack is expected to arrest itself. The second stage, called the critical
stage, is the predicted CL required before unbounded growth, or "unzipping", occurs.
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Basically, the respective CCL were determined using the well established R-curves (crack growth
resistance curves) technique, whereby the J-integral and crack-tip-opening-displacement (CTOD)
increase with crack growth. Instability occurs when the driving force curve is tangent to the R-curve
pertaining to a chosen material.
AV-2 RECOMMENDATIONS
As in all engineering disciplines, the utilization of selected analytical techniques requires a thorough
understanding of their limitations.
One should recognize the shortcomings for using quasi-static load (internal pressure) driver for
determining the SIF and crack extension or no extension, and using limited data on the fracture
toughness of the selected material used for the construction of the vessel.
Consider, at first, the dynamic effects on fracture mechanics problems. Here, time is an important
variable. At high loading rates, for instance, inertia effects and material rate dependence can be
crucial. There are two types of dynamic fracture situations that are directly related to the ISSA
pressurized elements: 1) fracture initiation as a result of rapid loading of the M/OD cloud pressure
pulse, and 2) rapid propagation of a crack. As an example, Figure 66 illustrates a typical load-time
response during impact JoadJng of a pressurized vesseJ. The pressure Joading (due to pro}ectiJe
impact) rises with time, but oscillates at a particular frequency which is in function of the geometry and
materials properties of the structure. The amplitude of the oscillations decrease with time, as kinetic
energy is absorbed by the structure. Thus, inertia effects are most significant at short loading times.
Because the scope of this work-study was very limited, the investigation of the dynamic effects on the
SIF was not conducted.
Additionally, the scatter in the material fracture toughness data for the 2219-T87 Aluminum Alloy,
mainly employed for the construction of the ISSA modules, is another uncertainty factor in determining
the CCL. Finally, the CCL for the FGB and JEM modules end cones should be also addressed.
It is highly recommended to conduct an analytical (and perhaps experimental) program for assessing
the dynamic effects on the SlF, so that to remove or to add of conservatism in the CCL predictions.
This program could show that the dynamic, state immediately following the impact event due to M/OD,
actually governs the potential for unzipping.
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Figure 66 - PRESSURE MEASUREMENTS in a TEST CHAMBER
UNDER BALLISTIC IMPACT LOADING
(Ref,: MBB / ERNO, Columbus Program, 1992)
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APPENDIX A
ALUMINUM ALLOY 2219-T87
MATERIAL PROPERTY DATA
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sheet and plate at room temperature.
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APPENDIX B
NOTES
on
FRACTURE MECHANICS
of
THROUGH-CRACKED CYLINDERS
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FRACTURE MECHANICS OF THROUGH-CRACKED CYLINDERS
FOL/A5 (Through-Wall, Axial Crack, Monocoque Shells)
valid range: 5 < R/t. < 50
=1¢
G o
KI c
a
D
ts
1
2K'cE ]/
= Hoop Stress
= material fracture toughness
= half crack length
= shell diameter = 2 R
= shell wall thickness
SIMPLE CRACK-TIP PLASTICITY MODEL
KTPM i -o.,oo.= Oo._.1- o.5._
= stress intensity factor
of = shell material equivalent yield (or flow) stress
= (oy + Ou).0.50
ou = shell material ultimate tensile strength
oy = shell material yield tensile strength
COD (_Crack Open/nF Displacement)
KCOD I [ ]-= 5.E.Oy. 1 +
24 Oy
= crack opening displacement
E = elastic modulus of the shell material
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VERY THIN PRESSURE VESSEL valid ran og; IO0 < R / t: < 2500
(Monocoque Shells)
¢3 = plasticity correction factor (Hahn, Sarrate, and Rosenfield, 1969,
Battelle Memorial Institute, Columbus, Ohio)
(_o_/-_,o(_(,_o_//_
-- \ 2.° / " \ \--_._//
o = average flow stress acting in the plastic zone (= yield or 0.5(yield+ult))
M = function of the crack length
I
.
= for very thin wall, low and medium toughness vessels with
relatively long through-wall cracks.
J-INTEGRAL end CRACK-GROWTH ( via Finite Element Method )
J ,, , d, d.,f,.I/ ut. l
_'o/ L\d_j/
.JS_
d$
V = volume; S = body surface
aii = stress tensor
ui = displacement vector
W = strain energy density
xi = cartesian coordinate
Aac = virtual crack extension due to _,xk
d
fi = body forces = -p.--u i
dt A-106
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STRAIN ENERGY DENSITY ( via Finite Element Method)
From Nodal Principal Stresses (o i a2 03 )
1 r(c_2
= __ ,._(°_}+C°,!_I(°,°_+°_°,_°,°,1
ERDOGA_ (Through-Wall, Axial Crack, Monocoque Shells - Initial Work)
Km = Am.Kp = membrane stress intensity factor
/---
Kp = 00 _.a
A m = 0.481._. ÷ 0.614 + 0.386.e- 1.25._.
1
v = Poisson's ratio
ERDOGAN/RATWANI (Through-Wall Axial Crack, Thin Monocoque Shells -
Ker = oe _ (A m +/- Ab)
1972)
ap = half crack length with plane stress plastic zone correction factor at the crack-tip
=
Am & Ab = membrane and bending components of the stress intensity ratio
(curvature correction factors)
+/- = (+) for outer surface and (-) forinner surface
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NEWMAN. Jr.. J.C. (NASA Langley Research Center, 1976)
Axial Through Crack Monocoque Shells
Kle =
F = shell-curvature correction factor for an axial through crack
00 ,c )'l°'°
a
ANDERSON rand SULLIVAN (NASA Lewis R.C., 1966)
Axial Though-Cracked Monocoque Cylindrical Pressure Vessels
Oec
Z¢
critical hoop stress
C = bulge coefficient
(Grumman, Reston, VA, 1993)
Axial Through-Cracked Waffle-Skin Construction Cylindrical Pressure Vessels
KIi = Kcr x Bwaffie x Bbiax x Bnl x B D x Bunc
Ker = ErdogarVRatwani predictive equation (see above)
Bwaffle = waffle-sldn correction factor function of crack length/location
Bbiax
Bnl
BD
Bunc
= load biaxiality effects coefficient
= nonlinear (geometric & material) effects coefficient
= dynamic effects coefficient
= uncertainties on the parameters coefficient
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JE_2J_Q2LT_/_ 1994 - (Though-Wall Axial Cracks for Curved Panels)
r ....
K. = oo.a • _-;_'-_ Xa_. sec
VB,_ _ o J _ W
W = panel width
13B
Aa = crack extension c e = hoop stress
nonlinear bulging factor =
r
I
/ E 't, /ao _ Aa \
, _ R j
_J I'IO'0l''_
2
= empirical constant = 0.67
STRAIN ENERGY RELEASE RATE (SERR) via Crack-Tip-Opening-Displacement (CTOD)
SIF =
,,,a
2.E.rn : o atip J'_ /E'°Y'StiP "m
........ i o'tip. 2-- da = =
a o f
.i0 ¢
J = Rice J-integral m = empirical constant function of crack geometry &
material strain hardening exponent.
6tip = crack-tip-opening displacement (CTOD)
STRAIN ENERGY RELEASE RATE (SERR) by Virtual Crack Closure using FEM
; E
SIF = (Fl'62 t F2'61t "state of plane stress"
F] : crcak-tip normal force (node 1) = principal stress x thickness (B) x L/2
F_ = node 2 force ahead of the crack-tip at a distance L/2
5t = crack opening displacement behind the crack-tip at a distance L/2
52 = crack opening displacement behind the crack-tip at a distance L
A-109
MA-TR-101-95
SECTION A

MA-TR-101-95
SECTION B
STORED ENERGY RISKS
of
FGB PROPULSION and
GYRODYNES MODULE
by
Charles J. Goodwin
B-i
MEYER ANALYTICS, INC.
WARRENTON, VA 22186-9212
USA

MA-TR-101-98
SECTION B
TABLE of CONTENTS
Bl
Bll
Bll
BIV
BV
BVI
LIST OF FIGURES
LIST OF TABLES
INTRODUCTION
SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES
FGB PROPULSION RISKS
BIll-1 FGB MODULE DESCRIPTION
BIll-2 FGB FAULT MECHANISMS
BIll-3 UNZIPPING as a GENERATOR of HOLES of LARGE AREA
BIll-4 FGB BALLISTIC LIMITS and DAMAGE CONTOURS
BIll-5 FGB FAULT TREES
GYRODYNE MODULE RISKS
BIV-1 GYRODYNE MODULE DESCRIPTION
BIV-2 GYRODYNE FAULT MECHANISMS
BIV-3 GYRODYNE MODULE FAULT TREE
FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS
REFERENCES
Page
B-iv
B-v
B-1
B-2
B-3
B-3
B4
B_
B@
B-11
8
.-Z8
B-29
B_2
B-44
B48
APPENDICES
APPENDIX
BI
BII
Bill
BIV
BV
BVI
FGB Module Propellant Tanks
UDMH Detonation Threshold
Overall Station Prime Structure / SARJ
Debris Cloud / Wall Energies - SSEIC Method
Debris Flux
Gyrodyne Module and Units
B-iii
MEYER ANALYTICS, INC.
WARRENTON, VA 22186-9212
USA
Figure B-1
Figure B-2
Figure B-3
Figure B-4
Figure B-5
Figure B-6
Figure B-7
Figure B-8
Figure B-9
Figure B- l 0
Figure B-11
Figure B- 12
Figure B- 13
Figure B- 14
Figure B- 15
Figure B- 16
Figure B- 17
Figure B- 18
Figure B- 19
Figure B-20
Figure B-21
SECTION B LIST OF FIGURES
Side View of Station
FGB General Arrangement
Assumed FGB Propellant Tank Dimensions
Geometric Probability of BL ( or greater ) Hits on Bumper, going on to
penetrate Tanks etc.
Specific FGB Targets & Failure Mechanisms
Concept of Crack Length / Equivalent Hole Dia.
Field of UDMH Detonation
Field of GN2 Venting from Propellant Tanks
Field of High Pressure GN2 Bottle Venting
Fault Tree Numbering Conventions
FGB Propellant Tank Fault Tree
FGB High Pressure GN2 Fault Tree
Gyrodyne Module with internal Gyrodyne Unit Locations / Allignments
Gyrodyne Unit Arrangement & Assumptions
Apertures
Probability of a Gyrodyne Hit following Penetration of the Module in its Aperture
Typical Fratricide Geometry--Cain-to-Abel
Module End View showing Gyrodyne Unit Geometry
Probability of Propogation of Rotor Rupture
Gyrodyne Module Fault Tree
Study Findings Summary
B-iv
Table B-1
Table B-2
Table B-3
Table B-4
Table B-5
SECTION B LIST OF TABLES
Proportion of Ballistic Limit (or greater) Hits that Penetrate Combinations
of Tanks, and Reach GN2 or GN2 plus Propellant
Venting Force / Hole Size to generate Limit Loads in SARJ
'd' Ratio Values for FGB Propulsion Elements
Probability of a Gyrodyne Hit following Penetration anywhere on a Main
Module
Feasible Cain / Abel Pairs and their Single Fragment Risks
B°V

B 1 INTRODUCTION
The primary purpose of this report is to describe the analytic and modelling work
done to assess the risks posed, to the space station and its crew, by the stored energy
associated with two, Russian supplied, modules. They are: the FGB ( a tug ,that is the
heart of stage #1 - the first launch ), and the Gyrodyne Module ( which brings the
station to stage 9 ). Figure B-1 shows where these two are located on the completed
station.( Stage 44 ).
On the FGB there are two types of stored energy, UDMH propellant ( chemical )
and gaseous nitrogen at pressure ( potential ). Both these fluids are in multiple,
robust, tanks or pressure bottles on the outside of the FGB, protected by bumper
shields. In the pressurized Gyrodyne module the stored energy is resident in six
flywheels ( kinetic ), one in each of the six gyrodyne units located within the module.
The module itself has a bumper shield. In each case, the impact of sufficiently heavy
and fast orbital debris is the mechanism that threatens to release the stored energy.
This is quite a wide field of inquiry and our resources have been necessarily
spread out in developing preliminary values for these risks. Consequently, the
secondary purpose of the report is to identify where a deeper, more narrow, look
should be taken where the risks, or their assoctiated uncertainties, appear greatest.
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B II Scope and Objectives
The subject of the work reported on here is stored energy ( close to the crew
modules, or inside crew modules ) and its possible damaging release. It is only
incidental that the modules involved are Russian supplied, and that their engineering
details are less familiar than those of other contributors. Our purpose was to quantify
the risks in a preliminary fashion, and identify either where; the risks were high, or: the
uncertainties ware too great.
There are three main steps in assessing orbital debris risk at a given orbit
inclination, orbit altitude, over a given time span:
1) Calculate the probability of a component / module being penetrated
( Bumper program output ).
2) Given the penetration, which is in general above the Ballistic Limit
rather than just on it, calculate the likelihood that the proximate result
will be serious ( eg Propellant detonation, Flywheel rupture, venting
violent enough to overload structure ).
3) Given a serious proximate result, assess the outcome ( eg. crew
hypoxia, repair of the damaged station, etc.).
Because step #1 is an ongoing activity by others, and step #3 has been studied at some
length in the past, we have concentrated our resources on step #2.
Our approach to performing step #2 has been to build, for each main fault
mechanism, a relatively simple Fault Tree, starting with the last node of step #1 and
ending with the first node of step #3. The nodes that comprise the full span of step #2
fall into two categories: 'Geometric' and 'Damage'. Geometric nodes deal with whether a
Ballistic Limit hit on the bumper will go on to hit the inner target object. These
Geometric probabilities are less than unity mainly because the target is smaller than the
bumper, or shadowed. Damage nodes deal with whether the penetration is severe
enough to cause a catastrophic failure. For example, not just any impulse on a
propellant tank but one violent enough to trigger propellant detonation.
The building of the fault trees, and the analysis that underpins their node
probabilities, provide the foundation for our objectives: to identify the failure mechanisms
that appear significant, and to see how deeper analysis or remedial action might resolve
them.
B-2
B III FGB Propulsion Risks
B II1-1 FGB Module Description. ( See also Appendix BI-1 through 7 )
The Russian suplied FGB module, as shown in Figure B-l, is located on the
centerline of the ISSA, pointing along the line of flight. When the station is complete
the module centroid lies about 366 inches behind the station c.g. The module itself,
see Figure B-2, consists of a central pressurised vessel, occupied at times by the crew,
with propulsion system tanks mounted on the outside of the central crew vessel. We
are concerned here with risks arising from hypervelocity penetration of these external
stored energy propulsion tanks. There are 32 of them: eight cylinders for UDMH, eight
for N204 (arranged in pairs--see the cross section in Figure B-2) and 16 spherical
storage bottles holding GN2 at relatively high pressure. The eight forward cylindrical
tanks are 2923 mm long, the eight aft tanks are 3528 mm long. ( Ref. B1 )
Figure B-3, which gives dimensions for both tank lengths, shows that each 480
mm alia. aluminum tank, long or short, contains propellant, either UDMH or N204,
together with GN2. The gaseous Nitrogen at a pressure as high as 300 psia. provides
3ositive displacement feed for the propellant, from which it is seperated by a sliding
_iston and stainless steel bellows. The piston is shown in the" all propellant used"
3osition. Since the tanks are assembled with their gas feed end forward, any projectile
3enetrating the outer cylinder of the tank will have to penetrate the bellows and/or
3iston before coming into contact with the propellant It should also be noted that the
3robability of a tank penetration reaching the propellant is influenced by the fore and
aft location of the strike ( see Appendix BI-3 ). Based on this, and assuming that the
debris half cone angle is 30 deg, and that the direction of attack is 45 deg from the
direction of flight in plan form, the probabilities, are:
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Forward, Short Tank
1) Penetrate to GN2 portion of tank only 0.575
2) Penetrate to GN2 and Propellant portion 0.245
3) No Tank penetration 0.180
Aft, Long Tank
0.590
0.254
0.156
Figure B-4, showing the bumper shield on the forward tanks, was scaled from
preliminary Russian Layouts; then, using a 30 deg. debris half-cone angle, a graphic
analysis was performed to dertermine what proportion of Ballistic Limit (or greater)
strikes hitting the 'strike height band' would go on to hit: the outboard tank, the inboard
tank, both tanks, or no tank. A similar analysis was done for the aft tanks, which have
a slightly different geometry ( see Appendix B 1-4 ), and the results are summarized in
Table B-1. When, in this Table, the strike-height driven probability is combined with
the strike-fore-and-aft driven probability, and the results for long and short tanks
averaged, the following may be seen. Given what would normally be a Ballistic Limit
(or greater) hit on the propellant tank bumper shield, the likelihood of:
1) Penetration to GN2 portion of the tank only, is 0.466
2) Penetration to GN2 followed by Propellant. is 0.202
3) No tank penetration, is 0.332
Furthermore, because only half of the propellant tanks contain UDMH, the probability of
this liquid being hit is about 10%,
Figure B-4 also shows how the high pressure GN2 bottles are well shadowed by
the propellant tanks against lateral attack. It is not straightforward to analyse their
exposure in exactly the same way as the propellant tanks because they occupy much
less length and do not have anything analagous to the piston and bellows. However,
when it comes to the GN2 Bottle Fault Tree, we use a conservative figure of 0.1 for the
probability of a Ballistic Limit ( or greater ) hit on the bumper reaching the GN2 bottles.
A more detailed analysis based on a firmer definition of the bumper might well halve
this figure. These geometric analyses are carried forward to the Fault Trees for
Propellant Tanks and GN2 Bottles.
B 111-2 FGB Fault Mechanisms
We have identified three general risks to the crew and the station that may arise
from hypervelocity penetration of FGB propulsion elements if the strike is severe
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enough. They are:
1) Detonation of UDMH propellant.
2) Damage to the station prime structure due to violent venting of the
gaseous N2, either from the propellant tanks or the high pressure
GN2 supply bottles.
3) Overpowering of the attitude control system due to generally lesser,
but longer-lasting, venting forces which, when brought under
control, may find the station outside its attitude control limits.
A description of these fault mechanisms and our estimates of the severity of
damage that can be tolerated before these faults occur are given in the following
paragraphs.
UDMH Detonation ( See also Appendix BII-1 through 6 ). In the FGB tanks we have
already seen that, to reach the propellant itself, incoming debris would have to
penetrate a three wall defense system; the bumper, the main wall, the bellows. In the
absence of directly applicable test data establishing a numerical detonation threshold,
we have come up with two possible measuring methods. For both methods, if a
'detonating attack'on the propellant is to succeed, the debris must, as a minimum,
penetrate the main wall--meet or exceed Ballistic Limit 2. For the first method, the
severity of the attack is measured in terms of the debris energy beyond the main wall,
which strikes the bellows -- the third wall--. On the other hand, it may be that only the
debris penetrating the third wall --exeeding BL3-- counts. Then for the second
method, attack severity becomes the debris energy beyond the third wall. The truth
probably lies somewhere between these two extremes, in part because the liquid
propellant is in contact with the third wall and 'experiences' some of the impulse usually
thought of as being absorbed in the third wall in a vacuum set-up. In this study we
have adopted the first of these two measuring methods, calculating the total energy in
the debris cloud behind the second, tank, wall; which is also the energy striking the
third wall. This choice is partially self-compensating because the energy associated
with tests is also subject to the same method of analysis.
We needed a numeric value of the attack energy --attack energy impacting the
third wall (bellows) -- to be used as a detonation threshold. A search of the literature
and enquiries within the propellant and test comunities yielded two useable test sets.
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The first test set was carried out at NASA Lewis Research Center in the 60's ( Ref. 2 ).
A tank containing UDMH, was penetrated by a projectile with impacting energy of 805
foot-pounds. There was no evidence of chemical interaction, combustion,or burning.
This test was also performed with Hydrazine in the tank, with the same projectile
energy and with the same negative result. We are taking this as a pessimistic, lower
bound, of the detonation threshold; ie. any more vigorous attack might trigger a
detonation. The second pair of tests were carried out at Wright Laboratory, Armament
Directorate, in 1989 (Ref. 3 ) A small target tank containing Hydrazine was attacked
by a fabricated projectile, which penetrated a bumper before penetrating the tank. The
first test went according to plan, the whole projectile hit the bumper and broke up, the
debris penetrated the tank with an impacting energy we calculate at 700,000 foot-
pounds; and the Hydrazine detonated. The second test did not go according to plan;
only the projectile cap hit the bumper, broke up, and penetrated the tank, this time with
an impacting energy of about 103,000 foot-pounds. Again the Hydrazine detonated.
For our puposes the first Wright Lab test is overkill; we are taking the second Wright
Lab test energy, of 103,000 ft Ib, as the optimistic, upper, bound of the detonation
threshold ( see Appendix BII-3,4,5,6, ).
This gap of two orders of magnitude between our upper and lower detonation
thresholds is probably a fair reflection of how 'thin' the test data is in this area. This
also provides some justification for our use of Hydrazine data instead of UDMH data in
establishing a provisional upper bound. There seems to be a measure of agreement
that these two propellants are similar ; the NASA Lewis tests provide some support for
this assumption.
Station Prime Structure Damage due to Venting ( see also Appendix BIll-1 through 6).
NASA has analysed the station structure and identified the Solar Array Rotary Joint
(SARJ), where the Solar Power elements attach to the port and starboard extremities
of the main truss, as being generally weaker than other joints in the prime structure
We are limiting our study of the damage that venting can cause to this designated joint.
Our approach has been to 1) calculate from the SARJ specification the limit Ioadings in
various planes that this joint can carry, 2) determine how large the FGB venting forces
would have to be to generate these limit loads, 3) calculate the diameters of venting
holes -- the penetrations of the propellant tanks or high pressure GN2 bottles- that
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could produce these forces, and 4) estimate the probabilty of such holes occuring.
Summarizing our results:
In normal operation the SARJ completes one revolution for each station orbit of
the Earth. Its torque limit strength, ie. it's ability to resist unwanted turning in this same
sense, is about 230,000 inch-pounds. It's overhang limit strength, in a station yaw or
roll sense, is about 180,000 inch-pounds. There is approximately a 5% fluctuation in
this overhang strength as the joint rotates; we have used a mean value.
For purposes of gaining insight, we consider four venting force directions; all
starting from the centroid of the FGB. Values associated with them are shown in Table
B-2. The first force is up or down in the plane of symmetry, --z direction-- and piches
the station. This symmetric venting force loads the six fittings that comprise the
moving parts of the SARJ, in both shear and tension. If the venting force rises to
4,080 lb. one of the six fittings reaches it's limit tension load of 731 lb. ( a 22,600 lb.
venting force is needed to bring one of the fittings to it's shear limit ). With the GN2 in
the cylindrical propellant tanks at an upper bound pressure of about 300 psia, and
using a discharge coefficient of unity, the vent hole diameter to produce this 4,080 lb.
force comes to 4.2 inches. Venting from the high pressure GN2 bottles at a pressure
of 3,300 psia, the minimum vent hole diameter works out to 1.25 inches.
The second venting force is still vertical but its application point is displaced
sideways out of the plane of symmetry and causes roll as well as pitch. The third force
is purely lateral --y direction-- and is, by definition, at the same height as the station cg.
- it causes yaw. The fourth remains lateral, but-- displaced up or down-- it adds some
roll to the station's yaw.
Several points can be made. The geometry of the station and the FGB, and its
tanks, make a venting-induced pure roll of the station virtually impossible; we have not
treated it. Again, geometry suggests that a pure pitch or a pure yaw producing venting
force, though just possible, is unlikely. Conservatively, we consider pitch-with-roll and
yaw-with-roll to be the central cases. Of these two, pitch-with-roll requires a smaller
hole to bring one of the fittings to it's limit load, and as such is the more likely to occur.
Table B-2 also shows that, under these loading conditions, the weakest aspect of the
joint fittings is their tension--not their shear--limit. At first blush it might seem attractive
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to improve their tension capability ( 731 lb. force is a very modest fitting strength that
might be increased a lot for very little weight or effort ) but this calls for consideration of
pressure vessel unzipping (see Section B 111-3).
The assumptions made in the foregoing venting analysis are generally
conservative. For instance, the load analysis used is qasi-static; a dynamic analysis
would give a lower peak load at the SARJ which is about 100 ft from the venting load
application point. The venting vectors will usually point a bit forward, which will reduce
the station disturbing moments. There will probably be some break-up of the venting
plume due to the torn bumper and stuffing, the discharge coefficient will be lower, and
the GN2 pressures will, on a time average, be lower than the upper bound values used
in Table B-2. This is particularly so in the case of the high pressure bottles. The
SARJ itself may not be designed right down to it's specification, and it may tolerate
loading above the limit level on a one-time basis. At each place where we have
simplified the analysis, we have made a conservative choice. One less conservative
subset of the venting scenario, has a propellant tank or GN2 bottle breaking free of the
station. We have not treated this.
Overpowerin 0 of Control. Detail investigation of this failure is not a part of this study,
but previous work on Freedom shows that, with venting forces too low to damage the
structure, but high enough to overpower the attitude control, and lasting long enough,
the station may be driven outside its normal guidance, star tracking and crew
environment limits. Some study, simulation, and training to deal with this, may be a
wise investment.
To conclude this section, Figure B-5 summarises the specific hypervelocity
targets within the FGB envelope, which we will be dealing with, and the failure
mechanisms associated with each. 'Unzip' shows up in this figure and it is timely to
discuss unzipping as it affects the venting forces.
B 111-3 Unzipping as a generator of Holes of Large Area
Venting damage to the prime structure is caused by GN2 escaping from a hole
with a certain minimum area. In the case of the propellant tanks an area of 13.6
square inches or an equivalent diameter of 4.2 in This size hole can be made by
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orbital debris within the range we are considering. But a smaller projectile can
penetrate and make a crack, initially shorter than the 4.2 in. diameter, which can unzip;
resulting within miliseconds in a hole many times larger than the 13.6 sq.in, above.
The preliminary estimate of critical crack length (ccl) for the FGB propellant tanks -
with their thickness, radius, pressure, and material- is 2.7 in. Calculating this length is
a first step; the second, estimating what combination of attack and defense will result in
a crack of this initial length, is less well understood. For the time being, we note that if
a plain crack ( like view a) in Figure B-6, with little or no holes or lateral cracks), is of
critical length L; then a largish hole with short radial cracks ( like view b), will be equally
critical, in an unzipping sense, when the crack-tip to crack-tip length is a little longer
than L. Essentially,the presence of the largish center hole, in a cylinder with hoop and
axial tensions, reduces the stress concentration at the crack tips. For this study we
are using the approximation that making an estimated hole diameter of 3.0 in. in the
propellant tank main wall is equivalent to forming a critical crack length of 2.7 inches,
from the unzipping point of view.
are:
For the high pressure GN2 bottles the logic is the same, but the absolute values
Minimum hole to cause venting damage 1.0 sqin. or 1.13 in. dia.
Critical crack length. 1.4 in.
Equivalent critical hole diameter 1.5 in.
For both targets, as projectile diameter is systematically increased, venting through a
hole that unzips damages the stucture before venting through a plain hole, -- unzipping
is the dominant threat. Moderate increases in the SARJ fitting tension strength would
not appear to improve this situation because a critical crack in the propellant tank, once
unzipped, presents too large a hole area.
B 111-4FGB Ballistic Limits and Damage Contours
On a field of Projectile Diameter vs Projectile Initial Relative Velocity, we show
the estimated Ballistic Limit together with appropriate Damage Contours above it.
Damage Contour ( a new term ) reflects the fact that not all hits above the Ballistic Limit
are catastrophic. Penetration hole size is zero below the Ballistic Limit, jumps to some
positive value at it, and grows bigger as the projectile size increases above it. In the
case of a crew module main wall, for instance, the effective penetration size just above
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the Ballistic Limit is not, in general, large enough to cause crew hypoxia. A Damage
Contour for this failure would be an estimated line on the field showing how much
above the Ballistic Limit a hit would have to be to subject crew to this catastrophe. A
specific Damage Contour is drawn for each of the targets/failure mechanism
combinations named in Figure B-5, and discussed in the following paragraphs.
Inner UDMH Volume The risk here is detonation of the UDMH. This is triggered by
the debris cloud behind the main tank wall (2) impacting the bellows (3). The
triggering metric is the debris cloud energy. We have three exploratory values: an
upper, optimistic ,threshold of 103,000ft Ib: a lower, pessimistic, threshold of 800 ft Ib:
and an arbitrary mid-way threshold of 10,000 ft lb. Figure B-7 shows the Field for
UDMH. The attack is by. Aluminum spheres of varying velocity, varying size, and an
obliquity of 0 deg. The defense is all of aluminum, with a bumper (1) .04 in thick, a
gap of 4.0 in, and a main wall 0.10 in thick.
The Field is divided, more or less vertically, into three phases that differentiate
between the state of the incoming debris behind the bumper (1), and influence the
position and slope of the BL within each phase. In phase A ( low initial relative
velocity, with the projectile passing substatially unbroken through the bumper ) for the
BL, we use the E. L. Christiansen Oct. '92 equations ( Ref.4 ) verifying that the
Fatepen2 ( Ref. 5 ) values and some SSEIC calculations agree fairly closely. For
phase B (intermediate initial relative velocity, with the projectile breaking into solid -not
molten- fragments on encountering the bumper ), for the BL, we compared
Christiansen; G, T, Burtch Hole-Out ( Ref. 6 ), and Fatepen2; and used the
Christiansen estimates. In phase C (high initial relative velocity, with the projectile
breaking into a mostly molten cloud on encountering the bumper, and with no
fragments large enough to penetrate the main wall individually ) for the BL, we again
used the Christiansen equations, checking that they agreed fairly well with some SSEIC
estimates.
To draw the Damage Contours for UDMH detonation, we need knowledge of the
energy in the debris cloud behind the main wall. Up to an intial relative velocity of 5
km/s, Fatepen2 gives a direct read-out of this quantity; at higher speeds Fatepen2's
applicabiliy is open to some question. In phase C we use a SSEIC derived method of
calculating cloud energy ( See Appendix BIV-1 and 2). The gap between 5km/s and
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most real life cases the three dimensional, vulnerable, main-wall target is smaller than
the bumper that shields it. So 'r' can never be greater than 'd' and is often less. Table
B-3 shows the 'd' values. ( See also Appendix BV-1 through 6 ).
B 111-5 FGB Fault Trees
There are three Fault Trees in this report, two in this FGB section and one in the
Gyrodyne section. All three use the sign conventions illustrated for a typtcal Node in
Figure B-10. Each Node on a tree has a reference number, starting on the left with
'0'; the 'yes' and 'no' branch probabilities always add up to one; each tree starts at
Node #0 with an absolute population of 1,000, which flows across the tree indicating
the cumulative effect of all upstream Nodes on the 'traffic' in each branch. The starting
population number of 1,000.was chosen to make an easy distinction between traffic
(using integers ) and branch probabilities ( using decimals ).
FGB Propellant Tank Fault Tree (_Figure B-11). Node #0 takes as a given that the
FGB module has been hit in the propellant tank shield zone with a projectile having the
wherewithal to achieve BL2 or above. Nodes #1 through #5 show on a purely internal
geometry basis what is hit and what is not. These numbers are derived from Table B-1
The populations of Nodes #1 and #2 are combined, bringing all the potential UDMH
detonation candidates together in Node #7. where we have used the most pessimistic
detonation 'yes' probability from Table B-3. All the GN2 venting that has not been
involved in a detonation is now gathered in node #7, and the SARJ damage 'yes' factor,
from Table B-3 again ,is applied. Finally, the remaining GN2 venting is put through
Node #8 where the 'yes' probability is just a low level placeholder, which if it were
addressed would probably shrink.
Summarising, the populations ( in the individual branches reaching the right of
the page ) when divided by the arbitrary 1,000, are the traditional 'r' values. UDMH
detonation is almost certainly catastrophic but, with an 'r' value of 0.047, very unlikely.
Going all the way from low detonation threshold to high, reduces the 'r'; value to 0.015.
Overloading the SARJ is probably not catastrophic, just expensive. At 0.30 the 'r'
value is significant and some of the simplifying assumptions made in this study may be
worth another look.
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FGB High Pressure GN2 Fault Tree ( Figure B-12 ). This Fault Tree is a simple
version of the previous one, with Node #0 starting with all the hits on the high pressure
bottle shielding zone that have BL 2 or above capability, Node #1 asks and answers
the geometric question "What proportion of penetrations of the zone bumper go on to
hit the high pressure bottles?" The proportion used ( 0.1 ) is conservative, and comes
from the discusion in Section B II1-1. Node #2 gets its 'yes' proportion from Table B-3;
and Node #3, at 0.1, copies the correponding Node in the previous Tree.
Summarising, with a Iowish 'r' value just below 0.1, each Node along the top
branch could be reexamined briefly. Node #0 for its underlying Bumper Ballistic Limit
(2) penetration rate; #1 for a better definition of the shield-to-pressure-bottle geometry;
#2 for a closer look at the reduced likelihood of unzipping as the storage pressure
falls. On the general subject of reduced risk, are the storage bottles emptied starting
from the front to exploit within-the-group shadowing, or could they be?
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B IV Gyrodyne Module Risks
B IV-1 Gyrodyne Module Description
The Russian supplied Gyrodyne module is located in the station plane of
symmetry, some 657 in. behind the station complete c.g. Again see Figure B-1. It is
mounted on top of the node at the front end of the Russian Service module and its
axis points up and down. The module itself, shown in Figure B-13, is a 2200 mm
dia. cylinder, pressurized for shirt-sleeves operations, containing six gyrodyne units.
Their locations and allignments are defined. Though not immediately apparent,
Gyrodynes #1 through #5 form a regular pattern, with #6 having a non standard
location and allignment. The main external feature of each gyrodyne unit is a 700 mm
dia. vacuum sphere with a spinning rotor inside. Components shown clustered
around the sphere are (presumably) controls, instrumentation, motor(s). Figure B-14
shows, on the left, the general appearance of these external items. They are not
defined in detail in the material available for this study, so we have in our graphic
work simplified the units down to the "icon" shown on the right. This icon shows the
assumed line of the rotor shaft and the plane of the rotor itself. Rotor data under
nominal conditions includes:
Rotation
Angular momentum
Assumed rim centroid dia.
Rim mass
Rim cross section, Steel
Titanium
Hoop stress Steel
Titanium
6000 rpm.
2500 n-m-s
25 inches
87.2 Ib
3.97 sq.in.
6.94 sq.in.
45 ksi
25 ksi
Rotation and Angular Momentum above are given; the key assumption is the rotor rim
centroid diamer; the rest of the data follows directly from the given data and the
diameter ( see Appendix BVI-1 ) It is worth noting that if the rotor rim is ruptured due
to hypervelocity impact, then (good news) the fragments cannot go faster than 200 m
Is, but (not such good news) they can be heavy.
From the information available, the Gyrodyne module does not appear to have
a general complement of functional and storage racks covering the inside face of the
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outer presure wall. So high energy fragments inside the pressure vessel are more
likely than in the case of normal crew modules to impact the mainwall, threatening
reverse penetration of the pressure vessel ( i.e., from the inside out ).
B IV-2 Gyrodyne Fault Mechanisms
In our firs_ look at this module, we identified three areas needing numerical
analysis before we could construct the fault tree. They are;
1) The "Aperture" question; given a penetration of the Gyrodyne
module, what is the probability of hitting a Gyrodyne unit?
Then there are two specific risks to the crew and the station that may arise if the
attack is severe enough. They are:
2) Loss of more than one Gyrodyne unit through fratricide. ( It is
assumed that loss of one is tolerable ).
3) Multiple Reverse Penetration of the crew pressure shell, causing
hypoxia, thrust or structural separation. Thrust and structural
separation have not been considered here.
To simplify the analysis of these three issues it was assumed that the orbital
debris attack was coming from a bearing mid way between quadrants III and IV, i.e.
45 deg from the direction of flight (see Figure B-15). It can be shown that there is
little or no loss of generality resulting from this. Taking each issue in turn:
The Aperture.. Not every penetration of the Gyrodyne module impacts a Gyrodyne
unit; and it is the probability of penetrating the module, that "Bumper" ( our starting
program) gives us. Figure B-15 shows the module looking down the attack vector.
Each numbered Gyrodyne is represented by it's vacuum sphere- a solid line- and
surrounded by an aperture - a dotted line. Penetrate the main wall of the module
within the aperture of a given Gyrodyne and the behind-the -wall-debris will go toward
that Gyrodyne; penetrate outside the aperture and it will not. The size of each
aperture is driven by the debris cone half angle ( here taken as 30 deg.) and by how
near or far the Gyrodyne is from the main wall point of penetration. Thus units #4,
#3, #5 are "near" the point of penetration and have a small aperture: units #1, #2, #6
are "far"with large apertures ( see Appendix BVI-13 ).
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When a main wall penetration occurs within a defined aperture, the question
remains," What is the probability that the Gyrodyne vacuum sphere will be penetrated
in its turn?" We have very little knowledge of the state of the debris behind a second
wall ( fragment and droplet size ranges, velocity ranges, temperature ranges ) so we
are treating the question parametrically. Figure B-16 has as it's output the 'edge and
range factor' which answers the question just put. The parameters used are 1) the
number of "dangerous" fragments in the cloud behind the main wall: 2) the effect of
the air drag within the module in vaporising smaller fragments before they can reach
the far Gyrodynes, and 3) the edge effect. This last takes account of the proportion
of fragments in a debris cone that will miss a Gyrodyne even though the cone origin
lies squarely within the subject aperture. In particular, as the cone origin on the main
wall approaches the aperture perimeter, this proportion falls, sinking to zero as it
touches the boundary ( see Appendix BVI-10 and 11 ). We have used an edge and
range factor of 0.82 for the near Gyrodynes, and 0.65 for the far ones. ( For air drag
see Appendix BVI-12 and BVI-14 through 17 ).
Table B-4 multiplies the aperture area for each Gyrodyne by it's edge and
range factor to obtain an adjusted area, which in its turn is divided by the total
projected side area of the module, giving the probability of a penetration of each
Gyrodyne following a randomly distributed hit on the main module, not necessarily in
an aperture. By this reckoning there is a 0.73 likelihood that that a penetration of the
main module wall will result in the penetration of one of the six Gyrodynes. This
estimate takes no account of the shadowing provided by the Gyrodyne mountings,
motors and controls, and as such is conservative.
Gyrodyne Unit Fratricide For this analysis, which is mainly geometric, it is assumed
that the rotor of any of the six Gyrodyne units can be ruptured when hit by orbital
debris that penetrates the bumper, the Gyrodyne module main wall, and the vacuum
sphere shell. Furthermore, once a rotor ruptures, it's fragments spread out in its own
rotor plane, perhaps disabling or rupturing the rotors of other Gyrodyne(s). Figure B-
17 shows typical fratricide features. In the lower left, Gyrodyne #2 ( which plays the
"Cain" role in this figure ) is drawn with it's rotor axle in the viewing plane and it's rotor
datum plane normal to the viewing plane. When the Cain rotor datum plane is
extended a couple of diameters it slices through the vacuum sphere, and the rotor
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disk, of Gyrodyne #3 ("Abel"). Given the Cain-to-Abel range and the impact diameter
(the heavy line cutting the Abel sphere), the probability of a randomly vectored single
fragment from Cain hitting Abel is readily found--see the equation at the lower right of
Figure B-17. This figure also suggests that the rotor rim width and a modest
fragment dispersal angle do not significantly drive the hit probability.
The impact diameter and the range, illustrated in FigureB-17, are determined
for each potential Cain / Abel pair using the type of geometry shown in Figure B-18.
From these topographies and dimensions, Table B-5 is filled in to show which Cain /
Abel pairs are feasible, and what the risk is that a single chunk from a given Cain will
hit the subject Abel ( see Appendix BVl-2 ). Note that Gyrodynes 1 through 5 can
play either role, depending on which Gyrodyne is first ruptured; and that Gyrodyne #6
, due to it's unique location and allignment, does not enter into the fratricide game.
The risk to Abel of being hit by a single, random, Cain fragment.does not vary much
from pair to pair. Though the risk from one fragment is not particularly high,we think
there may well be a considerable number of them.
Again, this is treated in Figure B-19, using two parameters. Parameter 1 is the
number of 'big' fragments that break clear of the Cain spherical vacuum shell. 'Big' in
this context means being capable of breaking into the Abel shell, very probably
striking obliquely, and at not more than 200 m/s. The rotor rim weighs on the order
of 90 lb.; if 'big' means weighing at least one pound, then, allowing for a scatter of
fragment size, Abel could be faced with 20 or 30 big ones. We look at the range from
1 to 100 'big' fragments. The rotor rim is remarkably robust: if steel, it has a cross
section area of four square inches; if titanium, seven. In either case it is working at
less than a quarter of it's yield stress. This brings up parameter 2; what percentage
of Abel sphere penetrations will end with the rotor ruptured? To get a feel for
sensitivety to this, we look at 100% and 80%. In Figure B-19 the output is the
Probability of Propogation beyond initial Cain rupture. Its value is sensitive to
Parameter I when the number of fragments is small, and a bit more sensitve to
Parameter 2 when the number of fragments is large. The scrap view on the right is
significant. The probability of propogation shown in the main field is the average of
six individual values for the six units; but, as already noted, unit #6 never propogates,
so the average of all six units cannot rise above 0.833. We have gone forward to the
fault analysis with a value of 0.75, which is probably conservative. ( For the
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derivation of the curves in Figure B-19, see Apendix B VI-2 through 9).
Before leaving the subject of fratricide, it has come to our attention in the last
week of this study that the gyrodyne module may be longer than we were originally
told. If this has been done, and the gyrodyne units have ( perhaps ) been moved
further appart, then the risk of fratricide will have been significantly reduced: this
should be explored.
Multiple Reverse Penetration It was not intended that a large part of this contract
effort should be spent on this risk, but based on work already done there are three
points to make. Firstly, from the fratricide subsection above, if a Cain rotor ruptures,
one fragment in thirty six hits an Abel unit, and the other thirty five -- give or take -- hit
the main wall. Perhaps these rotor fragments will be dispersed, spreading the rim
energy over a wide area, and the main module wall may withstand them. But until
this is better understood there appears to be some significant risk of multiple cabin
holes. Secondly, the absence of racks, clothing the main walls, makes reverse
penetration more likely; including that due to primary, incoming, penetration of the
module that does not involve interaction with the Gyrodynes. Thirdly, the hypoxia
danger to crew throughout the station is: continuous if the hatch to this module is
routinely kept open, and: presumeably, of very short duration if the hatch is closed
when the module is not occupied.
B IV-3 Gyrodyne Module Fault Tree.
The Fault Tree for this module uses the sign and numeric conventions
previously described, look back to Figure B-10. The Tree itself, Figure B-20, has two
dividing points labeled A and B, both of which are 'Ands' not 'Ors', so the absolute
population of all the branches increases above the nominal 1000 level as we move
from left to right. As on the previous Trees, Node #0 takes it as a given that the
Gyrodyne module has been penetrated- rhe risk of this was estimated, in late '94, as
.XXXXX for the ten years following AC. Immediately following this, the 'And" division
point A sets up the two main branches.
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The logic for chosing the'yes' probability for each Node after #0 is as follows.
For Node #1 it is a simple place holder; to refine it would require study of the module
penetration internal debris state, the absence of wall racks and, the effects of air drag.
For Node #2 it comes from the previous Aperture paragraphs and Table B-4. For
Node #3 it is a place holder chosen for conservatism. For Node #4 it comes from the
previous Fratricide paragraphs and Figure B-18. For Node # 5,the 'yes' probability is
again a place holder. Superficially it reads like that for #1, but we have quadrupuled
the value because, though the rim fragments are slow, they are massive and not in
the least softened by fracture heating.
Summarising, the stored energy in the rotor rims, perhaps amplified by
fratricide, is potentially a powerful damage agent. The high 'r' values, at about .7 and
.5, are also
due in part to the fact that debris moving within the module has multiple targets. Of
the three place holder 'yes' probabilities used in this tree, the conservative .9
assigned to Node #3 is the most in need of review by people with expertence of
flywheel rim rupture. In any case, the hatch open or closed protocol is an issue for all
the crew on the station, where ever they may be.
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B V Findings and Recommendations
We deal with each risk seperately, focussing the discussion on the appropriate
fault tree.
UDMH detonation ( Figure B-11) The Geometric Nodes ( #1 and #2 ) indicate that
only just over 10% of the propellant tank bumper Ballistic Limit hits 'reach' the UDMH.
This low % age. is due to shadowing, and the fact that, on a time average, UDMH
occupies only half the tank length, and that only 8 out the 16 tanks store UDMH. The
Danger Node ( #6 ) carries the pessimistic 'detonation yes' probability of 0.41, with a
resultant 'r' value of 0.047. This would fall to 0.015 if the optimistic 'detonation yes'
probability were used. We recommend that:
1) Interest in, and encouragement of, UDMH detonation tests be
maintained.
( Are there any relevant Russian tests ? ).
2) Details of the bellows in the FGB propellant tanks be obtained.
definition of these is a little thin ).
3) Thought should be given to to carrying the UDMH always in the
inboard tanks. ( To exploit shadowing )o
( The
Propellant Tank GN2 Venting ( Figure B-11 ) The Geometric Nodes ( #3 and #4, with
an assist from $6 ) result in about 60% of the Ballistic Limit hits on the propellant zone
bumper penetrating the GN2 volume of the propellant tanks. The Danger Node ( #7 )
carries a 'yes ' probability of overloading the SARJ fittings of 0.48, hence an overall 'r'
value of 0,298. The three main uncertainties in this 'overloading yes' probability,
where we recommend further.work are:
1) That the true tension or compression load on an individual SARJ
fitting after which its repair becomes 'Program Scale' expensive, be
determined.
2) That a deeper attempt be made to estimate initial crack lengths and
their resulting unzipped effective hole area.
3) That the effect of a range of GN2 pressures be determined.
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High Pressure GN2 Venting ( Figure B-12 ) Compared with the previous risk, the
Geometric Node (#1) and the Damage Node ( #2 ) both have different 'yes'
probabilities and the resultant 'r' value at 0.078 is considerably less; chiefly due to the
bottles being better shadowed. Item 1) above would also probably serve to reduce
our estimate of this risk, and we recommend:
2) and3) from above, be repeated with the High Pressure Bottle wall
and pressure range.
4) That the bumper shielding of the High Pressure bottles be more
clearly defined.
Overpowering Controls ( Figures B-11 and B-12 ) As previously discused, this risk
was not central to our study, nor do we believe that it would prove catastrophic.
Nevertheless, we recommend:
1) That venting scenarios, with forces large enough to overcome RCS
authority, be run against the control algorithms, and the conditions
pertaining when control re-asserts itself, should be estimated. If
these ( crew vertigo, star tracker, field of view, etc ) are not within
limits, further planning, and down -stream training, might be
indicated.
2) Depending on the outcome of recommendation 1) above a review
should be made of conditions when the station is lighter and smaller
and has lower inertia.
Gyrodyne Unit Fratricide ( Figure B-20 ) The Geometric Node (#2) and the Danger
Nodes ( #3 and #4 ) all have fairly high 'yes' probabilities; The resulting 'r' value at
0.493 is high, and we make the following recommendations
1) That the Node #3 'rotor-ruptured-yes'value, which is just a
consevative place-holder, be investigated in greater depth.
2) That control experts define in general terms what the loss, at one
time, of two or more Gyrodynes would mean to the station in a
programatic sense.
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Multiple Reverse Penetrations of Gyrodyne Module ( Figure B-20 ) For this risk there
is only one Geometric Node ( #2 ) and it carries a high, calculated 'hit-and-penetration-
yes' probability of 0.73. The other three, ( #1, #3, #5 ), are all Danger Nodes, and all
are place-holders, two of them with high 'yes' guesses. The resulting 'r' value of 0.726
is too high for comfort. We recommend therefore that:
1) Taking account of this risk, the hatch open-or-closed protocol be
defined,
If the hatch is in danger of being open for more than a small % age. of the time, or the
hatch protocol cannot be determined, then the folowing further recommendations are
made:
2) The number, weight range, velocity range, and temperature range, of
the initial main wall debris be studied, together with the presence of
module air and the absence of module racks, to provide an analytic
'yes' probability for Node #1.
3) That the same should be done for Node #5, exepting that the
fragments shall be those of a Gyrodyne rotor rim, not those of the
module main wall; and the absence of racks.will not enter into Node
#5.
4) We assume that item 1) under Gyrodyne Unit Fratricide above will
also be done.
Figure B-21 summarizes the study findings on one page. It gives prominence to
the major areas of uncertainty.
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PENETRATOR CHARACTERISTICS
Penetrator Material
Penetrator Alloy
Weight
Brinell Hardness
Shape
Diameter
ENCOUNTER CONDITIONS
Initial Yaw (Y or P)
Yaw Angle
Presented Area
User Impact Orientation
Impact Velocity
Impact Momentum
Impact Energy
AL
.000
1.457E+03 grains
1.200E+O2
Sphere
1.584E+00 in
A
4.020E+01 deg
1.971E+00 in_2
N
16236 fps
1.050E+02 ib-sec
8.520E+05 ft-lbs
N Mtlt T S
in in
1 AL .O630 .00
2 AL .0285 1.00
PLATE ARRAY CHARACTERISTICS
Theta Rhot Et Bhnt
deg ib/in^3 psi
.000 .i00 1.00E+07 120.
.000 .100 1.00E+07 120.
Sigmat Kt Ut
psi psi fps
6.00E+04 I.OE+07 1.6E+04
6.00E+04 1.0E+07 1.6E+04
DAMAGE TO PLATE 1
_tfl=l.85E+O0 in Dtf2=O.00E+00 in
9h =1.85E+00 in Npf2=O.OOE+O0
Mlt =1.19E+02 gn Dpf2=0.00E+00 in
It =9.89E+00 Ib-sec
DEBRIS BEHIND PLATE 1
Dtf3=O.00E+O0 in
Npf3=0.00E+O0
Dpf3=O.OOE+00 in
Dmf =1.85E+00 in
Nf2 =2.04E+00
Nf3 =5.98E+00
Nt =9.78E+02
VI =1.54E+04 fps
Mfl =8.36E+02 gn Dfl =I.15E+00 in
Mr2 =1.90E+02 gn Dr2 _7.01E-O1 in
Mr3 =3.01E+01 gn Dr3 =3.80E-01 in
Mt _7.73E-02 gn Dt =5.20E-02 in
P =9.51E+01 ib-sec
DAMAGE TO PLATE 2
Dtfl=l.47E+00 in Dtf2=8.98E-01 in
Dh =2.92E+00 in Npf2=4.00E-06
Mlt =1.33E+02 gn Dpf2=2.92E+00 in
It =6.32E+00 ib-sec
DEBRIS BEHIND PLATE 2
Dtf3=4.94E-01 in
Npf3=I.17E-05
Dpf3=2.92E+00 in
Dmf =2.92E+00 in
Nf2 =2.00E+00
Nf3 =5.60E+O0
Nt =1.36E+03
[ =1.51E+04 fps
Mr1 =8.30E+02 gn Dfl =1.38E+00 in
Mf2 =1.85E+02 gn Df2 =6.96E-01 in
Mf3 =2.69E+01 gn Dr3 =3.66E-01 in
Mt =4.17E-02 gn Dt =4.23E-02 in
P =8.87E+01 Ib-sec
Dtt =0.00E+O0 in
Npt =O.00E+O0
Dpt =0.00E+00 in
Dmt =1.85E+00 in
Phil=2.8OE+Oldeg
Phif=2.80E+Oldeg
Phlt=2.50E+Oldeq - ._
_E =6.97E+05 ft-lbs_
Dtt _5.20E-02 in
Npt =0.00E+00
Dpt =2.78E+00 in
Dmt =2.78E+00 in
Phif=2.8OE+Oldeg
Phif=2.8OE+Oldeg
Phit=2.80E+Oldeg
KE =6.39E+05 ft-lbs
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PENETRATOR CHARACTERISTICS
Penetrator Material
Penetrator Alloy
Weight
Brinell Hardness
Shape
Length
Diameter
ENCOUNTER CONDITIONS
Initial Yaw (Y or P)
Yaw Angle
Presented Area
User Impact Orientation
Impact Velocity
Impact Momentum
Impact Energy
AL
.000
1.457E+03 grains
1.200E+02
Cylinder -
2.040E+00 in
1.130E+00 in
A
2.812E+01 deg
1.971E+00 in^2
N
16236 fps
1.050E+02 ib-sec
8.520E+05 ft-lbs
N Mtlt T S
in in
1 AL .0630 .00
2 AL .0285 1.00
PLATE ARRAY CHARACTERISTICS
Theta Rhot Et Bhnt
deg Ib/in^3 psi
.000 .100 I.OOE+07 120.
.000 .100 1.00E+07 120.
Sigmat Kt Ut
psi psi fps
6.00E+04 1.0E+07 1.6E+04
6.00E+04 1.0E+07 1.6E+04
)AMAGE TO PLATE 1
Dtfl=l.69E+O0 in Dtf2=O.OOE+O0 in
Dh =1.69E+00 in Npf2=O.0OE+00
Mlt -9.92E+01 gn Dpf2=0.00E+O0 in
It -1.27E+01 ib-sec
DEBRIS BEHIND PLATE 1
Dtf3=0.00E+00 in
Npf3=0.00E+O0
Dpf3=0.00E+O0 in
Dmf =1.69E+00 in
Nf2 =4.54E+02
Nf3 =1.13E+03
Nt =5.64E+02
V1 -1.57E+04 fps
Mfl =7.02E+02 gn Dfl =1.08E+00 in
Mr2 -1.06E+00 gn DE2 -1.25E-01 in
Mr3 =2.00E-Of gn Dr3 =7.13E-02 in
Mt =7.73E-O2 gn Dt =5.20E-02 in
P =9.23E+011b-sec
DAMAGE TO PLATE 2
Dtfl-l.38E+O0 in Dtf2-1.72E-01 in
Dh -2.94E+00 in Npf2-0.OOE+O0
Mlt =1.36E+02 gn Dpf2=2.94E+00 in
It -2.22E+01 lb-sec
DEBRIS BEHIND PLATE 2
Dtf3=l.05E-01 in
NpE3=O.0OE+O0
Dpf3=2.94E+O0 in
Dmf -2.94E+OO in
Mr2 =3.50E+02
f3 =6.20E+02
t -3.84E+03
Vl -1.55E+04 fps
Mr1 =6.96E+02 gn Dr1 =1.13E+00 in
ME2 -6.64E-01 gn Dr2 -I.06E-01 In
Mr3 -8.77E-02 gn Dr3 -5.42E-02 in
Mt =3.54E-02 gn Dt =4.01E-02 in
P =7.01E+011b-sec
Dtt =O.OOE+00 in
Npt =0.00E+O0
Dpt =0.OOE+00 in
Dmt -1.69E+O0 in
Phil=3.20E+Oldeg
Phil=3.20E+Oldeg
Phit=2.50E+Qldeq
Dtt =5.20E-02 in
Npt -O.OOE+00
Dpt =2.62E+00 in
DNt =2.62E+00 An
Phif-3.2OE+Oldeg
Phlf-3.2OE+Oldeg
Phit=3.2OE+Oldeg
KE =5.11E+05 ft-lbs
B_2
PENETRATORCHARACTERISTICS
Penetrator Material
Penetrator Alloy
Weight
Brinell Hardness
Shape
Diameter
ENCOUNTERCONDITIONS
Initial Yaw (Y or P)
Yaw Angle
Presented Area
User Impact Orientation
Impact Velocity
Impact Momentum
Impact Energy
AL
.000
2.900E+02 grains -
1.200E+02
Sphere
9.249E-01 in
A
4.020E+01 deg
6.719E-01 in^2
N
16236 fps
2.089E+01 Ib-sec
1.696E+05 ft-lbs
N Mtlt T S
in in
I AL .0630 .00
2 AL .0285 1.00
PLATE ARRAY CHARACTERISTICS
Theta Rhot Et Bhnt
deg ib/in^3 psi
.000 .i00 1.00E+07 120.
.000 .i00 I.OOE+07 120.
Sigmat Kt Ut
psi psi fps
6.00E+04 I.OE+07 1.6E+04
6.00E+04 1.0E+07 1.6E+04
DAMAGE TO PLATE 1
tfl=l.13E+O0 in Dtf2=0.00E+00 in
=I.13E+O0 in Npf2=O.OOE+O0
Mlt =4.41E+01 gn Dpf2=0.00E+00 in
It =5.13E+00 ib-sec
DEBRIS BEHIND PLATE I
Dtf3=0.0OE+00 in
Npf3=O.OOE+O0
Dpf3=0.OOE+00 in
Dmf =1.13E+00 in
Nf2 =9.30E+00
Nf3 =2.39E+01
Nt =3.32E+02
V1 =1.47E+04 fps
Mfl =4.97E+01 gn Dfl =4.49E-01 in
Mr2 =1.49E+01 gn Dr2 =3.00E-01 in
Mf3 =2.69E+00 gn Df3 =1.70E-01 in
Mt =7.72E-02 gn Dt =5.20E-02 in
P =1.58E+01 ib-sec
DAMAGE TO PLATE 2
Dtfl=5.81E-Ol in Dtf2=3.93E-Ol in
Dh =2.32E+00 in Npf2=3.82E-06
Mlt =8.42E+01 gn Dpf2=2.32E+00 in
It -3.98E+O0 ib-sec
DEBRIS BEHIND PLATE 2
Dtf3=2.29E-Ol in
Npf3=9.85E-06
Dpf3=2.32E+00 in
Dmf =2.32E+00 in
Nf2 =9.47E+00
Nf3 =2.01E+01
Nt =5.95E+02
l =1.43E+04 fps
Mfl =1.54E+01 gn Dfl =3.04E-01 in
Mf2 =I.50E+OI gn Df2 =3.01E-01 in
Mr3 =I.97E+00 gn Dr3 =1.53E-01 in
Mt =4.68E-02 gn Dt =4.4OE-02 in
P =I.18E+OI Ib-sec
Dtt =0.00E+O0 in
Npt =O.00E+O0
Dpt =0.00E+00 in
Dmt =I.13E+00 in
Phil-3.08E+01deg
Phil=3.08E+Oldeg
phil-2.5OE+Oldeq
Dtt =5.20E-02 in
Npt :O.OOE+OO
Dpt =2.06E+00 in
Dmt =2.06E+O0 in
Phlf=3.08E+01deg
Phif=3.O8E+01deg
Phit=3.08E+Oldeg
KE =7.23E+04 ft-lbs
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A
J
L /
Launch Loads Point Coordinates
_nl_rfmce "-Orbiter Coordinates" "
/ Point X (in) _ (in) Z (in)
C ] 956.300 82.458 41r4,000 '
A 958.300 31.308 478.830
G 956.300 -31.308 478.830
J 956.300 '8,_.458 414 000[. 9_.300 -30.718 350.82o
E "1 956.300 30.718 350.820
i
Interface Umlt Loads Application Point CoordinMe s (For AnaJysls)
Interfmco Orbiter'Coordlnetes
Point
B
D
h
K
x (m) Y(rn) z(m) ,.
" 9,._.:mo 58.,J+4 +47.e1_,
954.3C_ 56.144_ 380.481
954.3C:. -58.14k,, 447.8'19
954.3._0 -58. i44 , 360.481 J.
Analysis)
6._- 2,
Figure 3.2.1.2.1.1-1. P3/P4 Mechanical Interface Launch and On-Orbit Load
Limit Application Points
:J- ;
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TABLE 3.1.3-1
English Dimension
X.XX
,,,,
X.XXX
LINEAR TOLERANCES
impiied Tolerance
(Inches)
± C).03
±0.010 i
3.2 INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS
3_.1 INTEGRATED TRUSS SEGMENT $3 INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS
3.2.1.1 ENVELOPE REQUIREMENTS
ITS $3 sb,_L1have =o obstr_crio_ to su,acmr41,mcchardcad_u;d ufiI;_y interfaces with ITS $4.
3.2.1.2 STRUCTURAL ANO MECHANICAL ATTACHMENT
Su'uctural life shall be demonsxratedin accordancewith SSP 30559, Svuc_ural Design and
Verification Requirements, paragraph 3.5.7. ITS $3 shall supply sztucmral and mechanical
provisions for The sm_cmral and mechanical azzachmem of ITS $3 Io ITS $4 dunng preintegrated
a,sscmbly.
3.2.1.2.1 STIFFNESS AND LOADS AT THE INTERFACE PLANE
3.2.1.2.1.1 INTERFACE MECHANICAL LOAOS
The _a-urbit interface lin_it loads _hall b,; ,, ;thin the limi_ _ho_,n iii Table 3.2.1.2. i. ;.- 1 a,ld
Table 3.2.1.2.1. l-2 for the ITS $3 to ITS S.1 s_ructural interface. Interface limit loads during
launch and landing shall be within the limits shewn in TaHe 3.21.2.1. I-}. Load reinls
correspond to Figure 3.2 1.2.1. I-1. These leads shall _ applied concutreml._ in all possible
combinations.
TABLE 3.2.m.2._._-_S3/S,L MECHANICAL INTERFACE ON-ORBIT
L MrrLOADSATA,C.=.,O,J,"
" Fx (Ib) Fy (Ib) Fz i'Ib_ 'i Mx (irt-lb) My (in--Ib) Mz (in-lb)
_731 _i:411 ::551 " =253 _:453 ±955
Note: Load ooinls correspond to'i:igure 3.2.1.2.1.1-_.
I I i
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